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## Strait of Hormuz, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea Military Operations

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### 1. Purpose

- 1.1. This Technical Alert is issued by the Bahamas Maritime Authority (BMA) to advise Companies, Masters and Company Security Officers (CSOs) of heightened maritime security risk arising from ongoing military operations and recent kinetic activity in the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea and Strait of Hormuz, and to reiterate mandatory Bahamas Flag State requirements under [Marine Notice 071](#).
- 1.2. This Technical Alert applies to **all Bahamian-flagged ships** intending to **transit, operate in, or call at ports** within the above-mentioned regions.

### 2. ISPS Security Level

- 2.1. **Effective 17 March 2026, all Bahamian ships operating in the Persian Gulf shall implement Security Level 2.**
- 2.2. The Security Level for all other Bahamian ships remains at Security Level 1.
- 2.3. Notwithstanding the above, whilst the ISPS Security Level for The Bahamas and Bahamian ships remains at Security Level 1 generally and Security Level 2 in the Persian Gulf, the Company Security Officer / Ship Security Officer may consider implementing ISPS Security Level 2 or 3 measures, as outlined in the Ship Security Plan. Please refer to section 11 of [Marine Notice 47](#).

### 3. Current security situation

- 3.1. The maritime security environment in the Arabian Gulf region remains highly volatile. Bahamian-flagged vessels may continue to operate in these areas; however, strict adherence to MN 071, enhanced vigilance, and proactive communication with recognised maritime security organisations are essential. The BMA continues to monitor the situation and will update this alert as necessary.
- 3.2. There is significant military activity across the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea and the Strait of Hormuz since 28 February 2026, with an associated

increase in the risk of miscalculation or misidentification involving commercial shipping.

- 3.3. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)<sup>1</sup> reports significant Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and electronic interference, including Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Very High Frequency (VHF) disruption, which may be intermittent and unpredictable, and may materially affect navigational safety and vessel identification.
- 3.4. Given the persistent GNSS interference and jamming during regional tensions, concerns remain with over-reliance on satellite navigation across merchant fleets, especially in high-risk areas like the Gulf. Resilience leans towards supporting multi-sensor Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) architectures to ensure navigational continuity. Radar parallel indexing and traditional ranges and bearings can provide that additional layer of positional integrity that seasoned bridge teams resort to for port approaches.
- 3.5. Claims regarding the closure of the Strait of Hormuz continue to circulate via VHF and open sources; however, no legally recognised closure has been promulgated through NAVAREA warnings or International Maritime Organisation (IMO) recognised Maritime Safety Information channels. Such VHF broadcasts are not legally binding under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

#### **4. Flag State Requirements – Marine Notice 071**

##### **4.1. AIS Policy**

- 4.1.1. In accordance with Section 7 of MN071:
  - i. The IMO guidelines permit the Master to switch off AIS in sea areas where there is a threat of piracy or armed robbery.
  - ii. Where an attack is expected or suspicious activity is observed, AIS should be re-activated as soon as practicable.
  - iii. Companies are required to take into account current naval and military guidance when determining AIS use.
- 4.1.2. Masters are reminded that AIS transmission decisions remain the responsibility of the Master, supported by Company risk assessments and Ship Security Plan (SSP) provisions.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.ukmto.org/>

#### 4.2. **LRIT Policy**

4.2.1. In accordance with Section 8 of MN071:

- i. **LRIT equipment must not be switched off** prior to entry into, or during transit of, a High Risk Area.
- ii. If LRIT equipment must be deactivated due to maintenance or repair, the BMA must be informed at the earliest opportunity via [lrıt@bahamasmaritime.com](mailto:lrıt@bahamasmaritime.com).
- iii. If LRIT equipment is deactivated or non-operational, the BMA must be advised, and the CSO must put alternative direct reporting measures in place to ensure the ship's position is recorded at least once every six (6) hours.

4.2.2. **The BMA is actively monitoring all Bahamian flag ships in the region and the above is essential for ongoing situational awareness and monitoring.**

#### 4.3. **Reporting Obligations**

4.4. Companies and Masters are reminded that LRIT does not replace operational reporting requirements. Vessels are expected to continue to submit initial and daily reports to UKMTO and other recognised reporting centres, in accordance with MN 071 and regional guidance.

### 5. **Operational Guidance**

5.1. In line with UKMTO and Joint Maritime Information Centre (JMIC) guidance, Bahamian vessels are strongly advised to:

- i. Conduct enhanced risk assessments prior to entering the region
- ii. Maintain a continuous listening watch on VHF Channel 16
- iii. Expect directed hails from military units and respond professionally
- iv. Where practicable, increase distance from military units to reduce the risk of misidentification. The United States Maritime Administration recommends that commercial ships maintain a standoff of at least 30 nautical miles from U.S. military vessels to reduce the risk of being mistaken as a threat<sup>2</sup>.
- v. Immediately report suspicious activity, kinetic incidents or electronic interference to UKMTO or other recognised reporting centres.

5.2. [Best Management Practices for Maritime Security \(BMP\)](#) should be followed.

5.3. A ship-specific risk assessment should be conducted and aligned with the prevailing circumstances and all crew members sufficiently briefed.

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.maritime.dot.gov/msci/2026-001a-strait-hormuz-persian-gulf-gulf-oman-and-arabian-sea-military-operations-and>

- 5.4. Beyond Hormuz, Lloyd’s List reports the US Navy has established a broad maritime warning zone and cautions that Houthi retaliation in the Red Sea/Bab al-Mandab cannot be excluded; the EU’s EUNAVFOR ASPIDES mission remains on heightened readiness. Taken together, there is a credible risk of dual-theatre disruption (Hormuz and Red Sea/BaM) if these trends coincide.

## **6. Emergency Response Officer (ERO)**

- 6.1. In the event of a security incident, detention, attack or other emergency, Companies and Masters are reminded to contact the BMA Emergency Response Officer (ERO) without delay:

**BMA Emergency Response: +44 20 3869 8748**

**Email: [tech@bahamasmaritime.com](mailto:tech@bahamasmaritime.com)**

- 6.2. Any incidents falling under the definition of marine casualty, as shown in paragraph 3.4 of [BMA Marine Notice 4](#), shall be reported on the BMA Reporting Portal as soon as it is safe to do so:

<https://cms.bahamasmaritime.com/reportingportal>

## **7. Validity**

- 7.1. This Technical Alert is valid until further notice.

## **8. Queries**

- 8.1. Any queries on this Alert may be addressed to [tech@bahamasmaritime.com](mailto:tech@bahamasmaritime.com) or any BMA office.

## **9. Revisions**

- V1.0 First issue  
V1.1 Addition of paragraphs 5.2 and 8  
V1.2 Correction of typo in para 5.2  
V1.3 Addition of section 2 on ISPS Security Level. Para.5.3 moved to section 2 and is now para.2.3