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Safe Return to Port

Notice to ship owners, managers, Masters, Inspectors, Recognised Organisations and surveyors

1. Purpose

1.1. The purpose of this Marine Notice (MN) is to provide explanatory guidance on the application of the Safe Return to Port (SRtP) and Orderly Evacuation and Abandonment (OEA) provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, as amended (SOLAS).

1.2. MSC.1/Circ.1369, as amended, is to be used by Bahamas Recognised Organisations as the basis for interpretation and verification of the applicable SOLAS SRtP and OEA requirements. The application of MSC.1/Circ.1369 and MSC.1/Circ.1369/Rev.1 is set out in section 2 and Annex 4 of this Notice.

1.3. The guidance provided in this Notice is intended to support a harmonised interpretation of SOLAS regulations II-1/8-1.2, II-2/21 and II-2/22 and does not introduce additional statutory requirements beyond those contained in SOLAS or associated IMO instruments.

2. Application

2.1. This Notice applies to all Bahamian passenger ships, including passenger ferries and ro-ro passenger ships, constructed on or after 01 July 2010, having a length of 120 metres or more or having three or more main vertical fire zones (MVZ), as determined in accordance with SOLAS[1].

[1] All main vertical zones in the ship should be counted for the purposes of determining application of the SRtP regulations. Horizontal fire zones, including special category and ro-ro spaces, should not be included in the count of main vertical zones. A main vertical zone may be extended to 48 metres in accordance with regulation 9.2.2.1.2 of SOLAS Chapter II-2; consequently, a ship with a length above 96 metres will normally have three or more main vertical zones. Applicability remains subject to the actual arrangement of the ship and any acceptance by the BMA.

2.2. This Notice also applies to:

i. Bahamian special purpose ships certified under the Code of Safety for Special Purpose Ships, 2008 (2008 SPS Code), adopted by resolution MSC.266(84), that carry 240 or more persons[2];
ii. Bahamian ships certified in accordance with the International Code of Safety for Ships Carrying Industrial Personnel (IP Code) to carry more than 240 persons on board[3]; and
iii. ships to which regulation 8-1.3 of SOLAS Chapter II-1 applies in respect of operational information following a flooding casualty.

2.3. MSC.1/Circ.1369/Rev.1 applies to ships:

i. for which the building contract is placed on or after 01 January 2028;
ii. in the absence of a building contract, the keel of which is laid, or which is at a similar stage of construction, on or after 01 July 2028; or
iii. which are delivered on or after 01 January 2032.

2.4. For ships contracted, constructed or delivered, as applicable, before the respective dates specified in paragraph 2.3, MSC.1/Circ.1369, as amended by MSC.1/Circ.1369/Add.1, together with MSC.1/Circ.1437 and MSC.1/Circ.1532/Rev.1, applies.

2.5. Notwithstanding paragraph 2.4, early application of MSC.1/Circ.1369/Rev.1 is recommended and may be accepted where agreed between the Company and Recognised Organisation, provided that its application does not reduce the level of safety established by the ship's approved design. Where early application of MSC.1/Circ.1369/Rev.1 is proposed, the revised Circular should normally be applied as a complete set of explanatory guidance. Any proposed selective or mixed application of MSC.1/Circ.1369 and MSC.1/Circ.1369/Rev.1 should be agreed with the Recognised Organisation and referred to the BMA for acceptance.

2.6. Publication of MSC.1/Circ.1369/Rev.1 does not, by itself, require an existing ship to alter an SRtP or OEA arrangement previously approved in accordance with the requirements applicable to the ship.

2.7. Provisions concerning maintenance of approved arrangements, management of degraded capability, availability of documentation, procedures for approved manual actions and reporting to the BMA apply throughout the operational life of ships within the scope of this Notice, as applicable.

[2] See MSC.1/Circ.1422 Unified Interpretations of the Code of Safety for Special Purpose Ships, 2008 (2008 SPS Code)
[3] See Part IV, regulation 6.1 of the International Code of Safety for Ships Carrying Industrial Personnel (IP Code), adopted by resolution MSC.527(106)

3. Background

3.1. The SRtP provisions outlined in SOLAS Regulations II-1/8-1.2, II-2/21 and II-2/22 were adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) by resolution MSC.216(82) and entered into force on 01 July 2010.

3.2. The SRtP and OEA regulations introduce several concepts including "casualty threshold", "SRtP systems", "safe area", "SRtP voyage" and "orderly evacuation and abandonment".

3.3. The SRtP regulations are intended to ensure that, following a fire or flooding casualty not exceeding the appropriate casualty threshold, relevant ship's systems can be restored and remain operational to support the ship's safe return to port.

3.4. The SRtP and OEA provisions are design-driven requirements. SOLAS does not prescribe operational instructions to the Master or crew following a casualty, and decisions following an incident remain subject to the Master's assessment of the actual circumstances.

3.5. During an SRtP voyage, all persons on board should be accommodated, where necessary, in safe areas where essential services for their safety and health are available.

3.6. If the fire casualty threshold is exceeded, considering one entire main vertical zone lost, certain systems are required by SOLAS regulation II-2/22 to remain operational for at least three hours to support orderly evacuation and abandonment. SOLAS regulation II-2/22.3.2 **does not** override the 30-minute abandonment requirement in SOLAS regulation III/21.1.3.

3.7. The SRtP regulations result in higher survivability of passenger ships following fire or flooding casualties. The increased redundancy and segregation required by the SRtP framework may also provide operational resilience in less extensive failure modes, such as component or system failure.

4. Definitions

4.1. The following definitions apply for the purposes of this Notice and the SRtP and OEA regulations:

4.2. ***Casualty Threshold:***

4.2.1. The casualty threshold is the maximum extent of a fire or flooding casualty for which the ship and relevant SRtP systems are designed and arranged to provide the capabilities required by SOLAS regulations II-2/21 and II-1/8-1.2.

4.2.2. The fire casualty threshold is defined in SOLAS regulation II-2/21.3 as the loss of the space of origin of the fire up to the nearest "A" class boundaries, where the space is protected by a fixed fire-extinguishing system, or the loss of the space of origin and adjacent spaces up to the nearest "A" class boundaries which are not part of the space of origin, where no fixed fire-extinguishing system is installed.

4.2.3. The flooding casualty threshold is the flooding of any single watertight compartment below the bulkhead deck. In the SRtP assessment, systems and machinery within the flooded compartment are normally considered lost unless designed and installed to remain operational under the applicable flooding conditions.

4.2.4. Where a flooding casualty exceeds the flooding of one watertight compartment, the SRtP casualty threshold is exceeded and the ship is not required to be capable of returning to port under the SRtP provisions.

4.3. ***SRtP Systems***

4.3.1. In accordance with regulation 21.4 of SOLAS Chapter II-2, following a fire or flooding casualty not exceeding the applicable casualty threshold, specified systems are required to remain operational or be capable of restoration to ensure propulsion, manoeuvrability and safety in all parts of the ship not affected by the casualty and to provide the required services in safe areas.

4.3.2. An indicative list of SRtP and OEA system categories is provided in Annex 1 of this Notice.

4.4. ***Safe Areas***

4.4.1. In accordance with SOLAS II-2/21.5, safe areas are intended to provide all occupants with necessary services to ensure that the health and wellbeing of passengers and crew are maintained during the SRtP voyage.

4.4.2. Means of access to life-saving appliances should be provided from each safe area, taking into account that, if the casualty threshold is exceeded, internal transit through the affected main vertical zone may not be possible.

4.4.3. Safe areas should preferably be arranged in accommodation spaces and sized according to the time required for the SRtP voyage. As design guidance derived from the applicable IMO explanatory guidance, for SRtP voyages longer than 12 hours, a space of approximately 2 m² per person may be used as a design reference. For SRtP voyages shorter than 12 hours, a space of approximately 1 m² per person may be used as a design reference. These figures do not constitute additional BMA minimum requirements.

4.4.4. Depending on the ship's operational area and expected environmental conditions, the use of external spaces as safe areas may be acceptable where compliance with the functional requirements of SOLAS regulation II-2/21.5.1 can be demonstrated, subject to the acceptance of the BMA.

4.4.5. The services to be maintained in safe areas are listed in Annex 1 of this Notice.

4.5. ***Orderly Evacuation***

4.5.1. Where the fire casualty threshold is exceeded, to support orderly evacuation and abandonment of the ship, SOLAS II-2/22 requires some systems to remain operational for at least 3 hours in all main vertical zones not affected by the casualty.

4.5.2. The systems required to remain operational to support orderly evacuation and abandonment are listed in Annex 1 of this Notice.

4.6. ***OEA systems***

4.6.1. OEA systems are the systems covered by SOLAS regulation II-2/22.3 and required to support orderly evacuation and abandonment after a fire casualty exceeding the SRtP casualty threshold but limited to the main vertical zone where the space of origin is located.

4.7. ***SRtP Voyage***

4.7.1. An SRtP voyage is the return voyage to port following an SRtP casualty. The duration of the dimensioning SRtP voyage should be determined having regard to the ship's SRtP design range, intended area of operation, weather conditions, remaining propulsion capability and associated fuel and safe area service requirements.

4.8. ***SRtP Bridge***

4.8.1. An SRtP bridge is a space where backup communication, navigation instruments and systems are available in the event of a casualty affecting the navigation bridge.

5. Demonstrating SRtP and OEA compliance

5.1. ***Assessment and compliance***

5.1.1. The SRtP and OEA provisions are design-driven requirements intended to be addressed primarily during the design and construction stages of a ship.

5.1.2. Compliance with SOLAS regulations II-1/8-1.2, II-2/21 and II-2/22 should be demonstrated through a structured assessment of the ship's system arrangements and capabilities following representative fire and flooding casualty scenarios within the applicable casualty thresholds.

5.1.3. The assessment should address the arrangement, segregation, redundancy, dependencies and interdependencies of SRtP and OEA systems. The assessment may be supported by a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), equivalent engineering analysis or other method acceptable to the Administration or Recognised Organisation acting on its behalf.

5.1.4. The assessment should identify any manual actions necessary to restore or maintain the operation of SRtP or OEA systems following a casualty and should consider the feasibility of such actions, including access, lighting, communication and the number of persons required to perform them safely.

5.1.5. Supporting documentation should be developed in accordance with the stage of the project and may include, as applicable:

i. ship description and design approach;
ii. system design concepts and arrangement drawings;
iii. assessment reports for SRtP and OEA systems;
iv. identified manual actions;
v. test programmes and verification records;
vi. onboard operational information for system restoration; and
vii. inspection, testing and maintenance arrangements relevant to continued compliance.

5.1.6. The Company shall ensure that approved manual actions necessary to restore or maintain SRtP or OEA capability are reflected in appropriate onboard procedures.

These procedures may be integrated with the ship's existing emergency, damage-control or safety management documentation.

5.1.7. This Notice does not introduce additional operational, training, audit or certification requirements beyond those contained in SOLAS and associated IMO instruments, except where a specific BMA requirement is expressly identified in this Notice.

*5.2. **Alternative Design and Arrangements***

5.2.1. Where electrical or machinery installations, fire safety arrangements or life-saving appliances have been approved using an alternative design and arrangements methodology in accordance with SOLAS regulations II-1/55, II-2/17 or III/38, the effect of those arrangements on SRtP and OEA capability should be explicitly considered as part of the relevant analysis, approval and verification process.

*5.3. **Manual actions and system restoration***

5.3.1. SRtP and OEA systems should be designed to minimise the need for manual intervention by the crew to restore required functionality following a casualty.

5.3.2. Where manual actions are necessary, they should be clearly identified, achievable and supported by appropriate access, emergency lighting and means of communication.

5.3.3. Manual actions may include actions required to restore system capabilities following a casualty or to maintain system operation for the duration of an SRtP voyage or OEA period.

5.3.4. Equipment and components necessary for manual restoration or operation should be clearly marked to facilitate identification on board.

5.3.5. The Company shall ensure that personnel assigned to carry out manual actions forming part of an approved SRtP or OEA arrangement are familiar with those actions and with the associated access, communication, lighting and safety arrangements.

*5.4. **Restoration time considerations***

5.4.1. Indicative restoration times for SRtP and OEA systems may be used during design, assessment and verification to support evaluation of system feasibility and integration.

5.4.2. Such restoration times are design and assessment considerations and are not intended to create additional operational performance requirements or certification criteria.

5.5. ***Gaseous and Low-Flashpoint Fuels***

5.5.1. Where a ship is fitted with gaseous or other low-flashpoint fuel installations, arrangements necessary to maintain the safety of those installations following an SRtP casualty should remain available for the duration of the SRtP voyage, taking into account the ship's fuel system design and relevant safety functions.

5.6. ***Decision Support Information***

5.6.1. Decision support systems or equivalent onboard information, where provided, may assist the crew in understanding system status, restoration options and alternative functional arrangements following a casualty.

5.6.2. The provision or use of a decision support system is not, of itself, a separate requirement for compliance with SOLAS.

6. Degraded condition due to maintenance or damage

6.1. ***General***

6.1.1. During the life of a ship, situations may arise where SRtP or OEA capability is temporarily degraded due to planned maintenance, unplanned maintenance, damage, equipment failure, refurbishment, modification or conversion.

6.1.2. Operational information provided to the Master should take account of MSC.1/Circ.1532/Rev.1, as applicable, and should enable the Master to identify the ship's available SRtP and OEA capability following a casualty or during a degraded condition.

6.2. ***Life-Cycle Compliance***

6.2.1. Any modification, conversion, refurbishment or upgrade affecting SRtP or OEA systems should be assessed to verify that compliance with the applicable SOLAS requirements is maintained and that relevant assessment reports, operational procedures, onboard documentation and operational limitation information remain up to date.

6.3. ***Degraded Conditions***

6.3.1. Where the ship no longer complies with the SRtP parameters stated in its list of operational limitations due to maintenance, damage or system failure, continued operation under degraded conditions is subject to the discretion of the BMA.

6.4. ***Risk-Based Assessment***

6.4.1. A risk-based approach should be used to determine whether continued operation may be accepted, taking into account the criticality of the affected system, expected effects on SRtP and OEA capability, intended voyage, operating area, weather conditions, operational limitations and proposed mitigating measures.

6.5. ***Category 1 Systems***

6.5.1. Where any Category 1A or Category 1B SRtP system is affected, or where degradation of any OEA system is sufficient to impair the capability required by SOLAS II-2/22, the Company shall inform the BMA promptly through the Recognised Organisation.

6.6. ***Submission to the BMA***

6.6.1. The Company's submission should include, as applicable:

i. the operational route or proposed voyage;
ii. expected weather and environmental conditions;
iii. the affected SRtP or OEA capability;
iv. proposed operational limitations;
v. operational countermeasures or mitigating measures; and
vi. proposed actions and timescales to restore full capability.

6.7. ***Pre-assessed degraded conditions and operational limitations***

6.7.1. Predicted degraded conditions for Category 1 systems should, where practicable, be assessed in advance and included in the ship's operational limitation information.

6.7.2. Pre-assessment of a degraded condition is intended to facilitate decision-making where that condition subsequently occurs and does not remove the requirement to notify or obtain BMA acceptance where required by paragraphs 6.3 to 6.6.

6.8. ***System Categorisation***

6.8.1. For explanatory and assessment purposes, SRtP and OEA systems may be grouped into categories reflecting their principal function. The categorisation in Annex 1 reflects the explanatory framework used in this Notice and MSC.1/Circ.1369/Rev.1.

6.8.2. For ships approved under the earlier guidance, the categorisation may be used for operational and explanatory purposes without requiring reassessment or alteration of the approved SRtP and OEA arrangements.

7. Training and familiarisation

7.1. The master, officers, ratings and other personnel assigned duties relating to SRtP or OEA system restoration should be familiar with the relevant onboard documentation, procedures and manual actions applicable to their duties.

7.2. Familiarisation and qualification should be addressed in accordance with the 1978 STCW Convention and Code, as applicable, and integrated with the Company's existing shipboard training and emergency preparedness arrangements.

7.3. This Notice does not establish additional SRtP drill requirements beyond those required by SOLAS, STCW or the Company's safety management system.

8. Surveys, audits and certification

8.1. ***Statutory surveys***

8.1.1. Verification of compliance with the SRtP and OEA provisions is undertaken as part of the SOLAS design approval and statutory survey processes.

8.1.2. This Notice does not introduce additional survey requirements beyond those prescribed by SOLAS and associated IMO instruments.

8.2. ***PSSC Surveys***

8.2.1. At each Passenger Ship Safety Certificate survey, SRtP and OEA compliance should be considered by the attending surveyor to the extent required by SOLAS and applicable IMO guidance.

8.3. ***International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) Audits***

8.3.1. Where applicable, SRtP and OEA related documentation, procedures and records may be considered during ISM audits in accordance with the ISM Code and applicable IMO guidance.

8.4. ***Forms and certification***

8.4.1. SOLAS and IMO guidance do not require the issuance of a specific SRtP certificate, supplement or form.

8.4.2. This Notice does not mandate the issuance of any SRtP-specific documentation beyond that required by SOLAS and associated IMO instruments.

8.5. ***Continued compliance***

8.5.1. The Company remains responsible for maintaining the ship, its approved SRtP and OEA arrangements, and the associated documentation, procedures and records necessary to demonstrate continued compliance. The Recognised Organisation remains responsible for carrying out the review and verification activities delegated to it by the BMA.

9. Existing SRtP ships changing flag to The Bahamas

9.1. Where an existing ship subject to the SRtP provisions transfers to the Bahamas flag, the Recognised Organisation shall review the design-stage SRtP and OEA documentation and confirm that the approved arrangements remain valid for the ship's current configuration and operational profile.

9.2. Where a Bahamas-flagged ship changes Recognised Organisation, the gaining Recognised Organisation shall review the available approved documentation and outstanding survey, class and statutory matters sufficiently to confirm continued compliance. A new design assessment is not required unless modifications, missing documentation or other material concerns call the validity of the original assessment into question.

9.3. The following documentation shall be retained on board or be readily available to the Master and Recognised Organisation:

i. approved SRtP or equivalent design-assessment documentation;
ii. relevant system arrangement and segregation information;
iii. operational information and procedures for approved manual actions;
iv. records of modifications affecting SRtP or OEA capability; and
v. any approved operational limitations.

9.4. Where original documentation is unavailable because of the ship's age, ownership history or previous regulatory arrangements, alternative evidence may be accepted by the BMA on the recommendation of the Recognised Organisation.

9.5. This review is limited to confirmation of compliance with the applicable SOLAS provisions and does not introduce additional operational, training, drill, audit or certification requirements beyond those contained in SOLAS and associated IMO instruments.

10. Queries

10.1. Any queries on this Notice may be addressed to tech@bahamasmaritime.com or any BMA office.

Annex 1 – SRtP and OEA System Categories

This Annex is provided for explanatory purposes only and does not establish mandatory design, operational or certification requirements beyond SOLAS. The system groupings and descriptions in this Annex reflect IMO explanatory guidance and are provided to assist in understanding the functional grouping of SRtP and OEA systems.

Category 1A – Systems providing propulsion, electrical power and steering

System	Notes
Propulsion systems and essential auxiliaries	Redundancy for propulsion, steering and electrical production is required. Propulsion engines and electrical generators should be distributed in at least two separate engine rooms, as well as main switchboards and all essential auxiliaries for propulsion and electrical production being suitably segregated.
Electrical power plant and essential auxiliaries	
Steering system and its power and control systems	Two steering gear rooms should be arranged and fitted with a fixed extinguishing system if they are adjacent. Tunnel thrusters are not to be considered for emergency steering.
System for filling, transfer and service of fuel oil	The fuel necessary for the remaining main engine(s) and diesel generators should be available in sufficient quantities for the whole SRtP voyage – the operating pattern of the ship will have an important impact on the quantity of fuel required, as a worldwide cruise ship will have different needs from a passenger ro-ro on short international voyages.

Category 1B – Navigation and external communication systems

System	Notes
Navigation systems	In case of casualty affecting the bridge, an alternative place should be arranged where essential equipment (fixed or portable) for navigation and detection of risk of collision is available for the duration of the SRtP voyage.
Internal and external communication systems	The public-address system, arranged as general alarm, should remain operational in all areas not affected by the fire. Portable communication systems are acceptable for internal communication, provided the repeater system remains operational and charging facilities are available in more than one main vertical zone. The ship should be capable of communicating via the GMDSS or the VHF Marine and Air Band distress frequencies, even if the main GMDSS equipment is lost.

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Category 2 – Systems serving multiple compartments

System	Notes
Fire main system	The fire main may be isolated in the main fire zone affected by the casualty. The affected main fire zone can then be served from hydrants of adjacent zones or watertight compartments. Fire hoses may be extended for firefighting within the affected main fire zone using two lengths of hoses from each hydrant. Manual local start of remaining fire pumps may be accepted after a casualty.
Fixed fire extinguishing systems	The layout of the sprinkler or equivalent system should be carefully reviewed and pumps should be duplicated and installed in separate compartments. Each section should not serve more than one deck in one main vertical zone. CO_2 total flooding extinguishing system capacity to be sufficient to protect the largest space and the second largest space.
Fire and smoke detection system	The architecture of the smoke detection system may have to be modified in order to remain operational in spaces not directly affected by the fire casualty. It will be acceptable to lose detection in maximum one deck in one fire zone.
Bilge and ballast systems	Proper distribution of bilge and ballast pumps is necessary, as well as careful routing of the piping. Extra manual controlled section valves may be necessary when crossing watertight compartment bulkheads to segregate any flooded compartment.
Watertight and semi-watertight doors	Position indication of the doors should remain available for any fire casualty within the casualty threshold, except for doors in the boundary of spaces directly affected by the casualty.
Flooding detection systems	The flooding detection system should remain operational in all watertight compartments not affected by the casualty.

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Category 3 – Systems supporting safe areas

System	Notes
Sanitation	As a minimum, one toilet for every 50 persons, or fraction thereof, should remain operational.
Drinking water	Minimum of 3 litres of drinking water per person per day in addition to water required for food preparation.
Food	Sufficient food should be available for the duration of the SRtP voyage.
Alternate space for medical care	The alternate space should be in a different main vertical zone from the hospital or primary medical centre, be readily accessible and have lighting and power supply from the main and emergency sources of electrical power.
Shelter from the weather	Use of exterior spaces as safe areas may be permitted where the ship is operating in warm climates.
Means of preventing hypothermia or heat stress	The temperature within safe areas should be maintained in the range of 10° to 30° Celsius (50° to 86° Fahrenheit).
Lighting not covered by the ship's emergency lighting system	Portable rechargeable battery-operated lighting may be acceptable for use in safe area spaces.
Ventilation	Ventilation should be available at a minimum rate of 4.5m^3 per hour per person.

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Category 4 – Systems supporting orderly evacuation and abandonment

System	Notes
Fire main	The fire main should remain operational in all main vertical zones not directly affected by the casualty. Water for fire-fighting purposes should be available to all areas of the ship.
Internal communication for passenger and crew notification and evacuation	A means should be available for communicating orders to fire-fighting and damage control teams and personnel in charge of evacuation and abandonment.
External communication	External communication should remain available from an alternative location outside the main vertical zone affected by the casualty. GMDSS equipment equivalent to that required for the SRtP scenario should be available in another main vertical zone.
Bilge system	The bilge pumping system and all associated equipment essential for its operation should be available in all other MVZ not affected by the casualty.
Evacuation and abandonment systems	Electrical power and lighting should be available along escape routes, muster station and embarkation station for the abandonment of the ship. Particular attention should be given to the lifesaving appliances and systems referred to in SOLAS regulation II-2/22.3.1, as may be operated at the same time.

Annex 2 – SRtP Testing Process

This Annex provides examples of acceptable approaches to demonstrating SRtP and OEA capabilities. The testing arrangements described are indicative and may be adapted, supplemented or replaced by alternative means acceptable to the BMA or Recognised Organisation acting on its behalf.

SRtP and OEA compliance should be tested and documented as part of the design approval, construction, commissioning and verification process. The test strategy should be developed early in the project and should identify the method of testing, acceptance criteria and representative casualty scenarios to be used for demonstrating that the relevant systems can be restored or remain operational.

In order to avoid extensive testing of SRtP compliance at the later stages, the tests should as far as possible be done in connection with normal system commissioning and tests. The test strategy should include a plan for when, how and to what extent it may be verified that the consequence of representative SRtP casualties (fire/flooding) does not render any of the required systems inoperable in other compartments.

If an appropriate SRtP test strategy is developed and verified through the various phases of completion and commissioning, this may limit the extent of SRtP related tests in the later phases, including quay and sea trials. The test strategy may be a part of the ship description document or made as a separate document. In either case, it should be submitted to the Recognised Organisation for review and acceptance, as applicable.

Certain tests are deemed necessary during trials to verify the ship's capabilities after the fire or flooding casualty scenarios. The test programme for SRtP quay and sea trials should be submitted to the Recognised Organisation for review. The test programme should include representative worst-case casualty scenarios within the applicable casualty threshold. These will normally include scenarios requiring the greatest number or most complex combination of manual actions, such as loss of a complete engine room, machinery control room, navigation bridge or other critical compartment. The main purposes of running these tests are:

(i) to demonstrate that the machinery arrangement is designed to support simultaneous availability of auxiliaries and supporting systems to enable operation of the remaining propulsion line after a casualty;
(ii) to demonstrate that the power needed to achieve the intended speed and maintain power to all SRtP systems necessary to reach port may be generated without exceeding the manufacturer's recommended operational limits;
(iii) to demonstrate that the operation is feasible and that necessary means of control and monitoring for all necessary systems are available; and
(iv) to demonstrate that any manual actions necessary to restore or maintain operation are identified, practicable and manageable.

Furthermore, it is considered necessary to run a specific test to demonstrate compliance with the OEA scenario (regulation 22 of SOLAS Chapter II-2). This includes simulating the loss of a complete (the most critical) main vertical zone and demonstrating that the required systems remain operational in the other MVZs. The "most critical zone" in this respect is normally

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considered to be the MVZ where a loss would have the most significant impact for the power generation and distribution system, i.e. the MVZ containing the engine rooms and switchboard rooms. This test is normally done whilst the ship is alongside and should not require any physical alteration of SRtP equipment during testing, as this may impair the original certification issued and verified by the Recognised Organisation.

Alternative means of testing or simulation may be accepted. The number and selection of SRtP and OEA scenarios should be agreed with the Recognised Organisation and should be sufficient to verify representative worst-case casualty scenarios identified in the approved assessment. Examples may include:

i. loss of one engine-room space representing a worst-case machinery scenario;
ii. loss of the navigation bridge or machinery control room; and
iii. loss of another critical space or main vertical zone identified in the approved assessment.

The test documentation and the SRtP Manual should include the total number of persons involved in the SRtP activities.

Sea trial testing should, where practicable, include simulation of the worst-case degraded propulsion and steering capability after an SRtP casualty to document speed and manoeuvrability. Alternative means of demonstration may be accepted where sea trial testing is impracticable or where equivalent evidence is provided.

In addition to SRtP testing, a representative OEA scenario should be tested where restoration of OEA systems is demonstrated after simulated loss of one complete main vertical zone. This test should normally be carried out while the ship is at berth.

Annex 3 – SRtP Operational Limitation Examples

This Annex provides an example of information that may be used to record SRtP design capabilities and degraded capabilities for Category 1 systems. The format is illustrative and may be adapted to suit the ship's design, operational profile and documentation arrangements.

The following Safe Return to Port operational limitations form part of the ship's operational limitation information, where applicable. This information is to be used for Category 1 systems only. For systems other than Category 1, refer to the maintenance plan, as applicable.

SRtP design capabilities	**SRtP degraded capabilities**
Basis of calculation:	☐ MSC.1/Circ.1369 ☐ MSC.1/Circ.1369/Rev.1
Date of approved assessment:	
Distance: Speed and duration: Fuel type: Fuel capacity:	Distance: Speed and duration: Fuel type: Fuel capacity:
Degraded operational condition: *For example, reduced propulsion capability, reduced electrical generating capacity, or reduced steering capability.*	
Degraded scenario: (most credible or limiting maintenance or damage scenario) *Example: No.1 engine unavailable due to maintenance*	
Degraded condition capability: Distance, speed, duration, fuel type, fuel capacity and weather limitations.	
Operational countermeasures: Continuous fire watch; or standby tug support at the nearest suitable port.	
Optional: This information may be included in the ship's maintenance plan.	

The approved operating range is based on the guidance and assumptions applicable when the ship's SRtP assessment was approved. Publication of revised explanatory guidance does not, by itself, require recalculation of an existing approved range. Voluntary reassessment may be undertaken with the agreement of the Recognised Organisation, subject to BMA acceptance where the approved operational limitations would change.

Annex 4 – Application of MSC.1/Circ.1369 and MSC.1/Circ.1369/Rev.1

This Annex provides a simplified illustration of the application dates for MSC.1/Circ.1369/Rev.1. Where there is any inconsistency between this illustration and the applicable IMO instrument, the IMO instrument takes precedence.



Revision History

Version	Description of Revision
1.0	First Issue
1.1	Periodic review and new branding.
1.2	Removed erroneous blank page 4
1.3	Periodic review and editorial amendments
2.0	Major revision to align with MSC.1/Circ.1369/Rev.1, including its application dates, and revised guidance on SRtP and OEA assessment, documentation, testing, degraded conditions and life-cycle compliance. Added an application flow chart as Annex 4 and removed BMA-specific Form S requirements.