
Safe Return to Port

Notice to ship owners, managers, Masters, Approved Nautical Inspectors, Recognised Organisations and surveyors

This Marine Notice replaces BMA Information Bulletin No.179 Rev0

1. Purpose

- 1.1. The purpose of this Marine Notice (MN) is to provide guidance on the application of the Safe Return to Port (SRtP) provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, as amended (SOLAS).
- 1.2. The MN also includes instructions to Recognised Organisations to be followed when conducting surveys of ships registered in The Bahamas to which the SRtP provisions apply.

2. Application

- 2.1. This MN applies to all Bahamian passenger ships, including passenger ferries and passenger ro-ro ships, constructed on or after 01 July 2010 having a length¹ of 120 metres or more, or having three or more main vertical fire zones (MVZ)².
- 2.2. This MN also applies to Bahamian special purpose ships (SPS) certified under the 2008 SPS Code (MSC.266(84)) that carry 240 or more persons (see MSC.1/Circ.1422 *Unified Interpretations of the Code of Safety for Special Purpose Ships, 2008 (2008 SPS Code)*³).

¹ Length (L) is the length as defined in the International Convention on Load Lines.

² All main vertical zones in the ship should be counted for the purposes of this regulation, irrespective of whether they contain accommodation spaces or not. Nevertheless, horizontal fire zone (special category and ro-ro spaces) should not be included in the count of main vertical zones. A main vertical zone may be extended to 48 metres (SOLAS Regulation II-2/9.2.2.1.2). **This implies that any ship having an overall length (LOA) of more than 96 metres should normally comply with the SRtP regulations.**

³ Available at http://www.bahamasmaritime.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/MSC1_Circ1422.pdf

3. Background

- 3.1. The SRtP provisions outlined in SOLAS Regulations II-1/8-1, II-2/21 and II-2/22 were adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as Resolution MSC.216(82) and entered into force on 01 July 2010.
- 3.2. The SRtP regulations introduce several new concepts such as: “casualty threshold”, “essential systems”, “safe area” and “orderly evacuation” - see Section 4 of this Bulletin.
- 3.3. The SRtP regulations aim to ensure that some ship’s systems are available to enable a ship to return to port under its own power after a fire or a flooding event that has not exceeded the casualty threshold.
- 3.4. During an SRtP voyage, all persons on board shall be accommodated, if necessary, in a safe area where essential services for their safety and health are available.
- 3.5. If the casualty threshold is exceeded, considering one entire main fire zone lost, some essential systems are required to remain operational for three hours to support the orderly evacuation of the ship. It should be noted that SOLAS II-2/22.3.2 does not override the 30 minutes for abandonment required by SOLAS III/21.1.3.
- 3.6. The SRtP regulations result in higher survivability of passenger ships when subjected to flooding and fire casualty cases. Besides the naturally increased safety standards which lower the risk of accidents and total loss of the ship; the higher level of redundancy will also result in operational benefits and challenges.

4. Definitions

- 4.1. The following definitions apply for the purposes of this Bulletin and the SRtP regulations:
- 4.2. Casualty Threshold:
 - 4.2.1. There are two casualty thresholds defined under the SRtP regulations:
 - i. The fire casualty threshold is defined in SOLAS II-2/21.3 as being the loss of the space of the origin of the fire up to the nearest “A” class boundary if the space is protected by a fixed fire-fighting system or the loss of the space of origin and adjacent spaces up to the nearest A-class boundaries which are not part of the space of origin where no fixed fire-fighting systems are installed.
 - ii. The flooding casualty threshold is the flooding of any single watertight compartment below the bulkhead deck. However, in this context flooding through unprotected openings and pipes must also be considered. In the SRtP assessment, all systems or machinery within the flooded compartment are considered as lost, unless they are suitably rated or protected. The essential systems must remain operational in all other compartments.

4.2.2. In a scenario where a flooding casualty case exceeds the flooding of one watertight compartment, the casualty threshold is considered to be exceeded, and the ship is not required to be able to return to port.

4.3. Essential Systems

4.3.1. In accordance with SOLAS II-2/21.4, after a fire or flooding casualty not exceeding the threshold, specific systems are required to be available to ensure propulsion, manoeuvrability and to maintain safety in all parts of the ship not affected by the casualty, as well as to provide required services in the safe areas.

4.3.2. An indicative list of essential systems is provided in Annex 1 of this Bulletin.

4.4. Safe Areas

4.4.1. In accordance with SOLAS II-2/21.5, safe areas are intended to provide all occupants with necessary services to ensure that the health and wellbeing of passengers and crew are maintained during the SRtP voyage.

4.4.2. Means of access to life-saving appliances shall be provided from each safe area, taking into account that, if the casualty threshold is exceeded, internal transit through the affected main vertical zone may not be possible.

4.4.3. Safe areas should be arranged in accommodation spaces and with size based on the time needed for the SRtP voyage. A minimum space per person of 2m² should be available in the safe area(s) for any SRtP voyage that is expected to take longer than 12 hours.

4.4.4. Depending on the ship's operational area and conditions, permission to use exterior spaces as safe areas may be granted by the BMA, provided that compliance with the functional requirements of SOLAS II-2/21.5.1 can be demonstrated.

4.4.5. A list of the services to be maintained in the safe area is listed in Annex 1 of this Bulletin.

4.5. Orderly Evacuation

4.5.1. Where the fire casualty threshold is exceeded, to support orderly evacuation and abandonment of the ship, SOLAS II-2/22 requires some systems to remain operational for at least 3 hours in all main vertical zones not affected by the casualty.

4.5.2. A list of the services that are required to remain operational to support orderly evacuation are listed in Annex 1 of this Bulletin.

4.6. SRtP Voyage

4.6.1. An SRtP voyage is the voyage undertaken by the ship following a fire or flooding casualty after essential systems have been restored.

5. Demonstrating SRtP compliance

5.1. Assessment and Compliance:

- i. The SRtP regulations present certain challenges from the design and operational perspective, as they may affect the arrangement of the ship's systems.
- ii. To establish full SRtP compliance, an early phase activity shall be carried out during the new shipbuilding to cover design and test criteria. This activity shall envisage the ship in service in degraded condition due to unexpected incidents or planned maintenance.
- iii. A Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) or equivalent safety analysis shall be carried out for each essential system. The analysis is part of the new-building process and it shall cover each essential SRtP system. The analysis shall cover the system arrangement, its actual physical location and assess the impact of casualties in any applicable casualty threshold. A conclusive report shall be provided that identifies eventual manual actions needed for system restoration and possible eventual actions needed for the system to remain operational for the voyage back to port.
- iv. Each FMEA or equivalent analysis, is to be reviewed and approved by the Recognised Organisation that classes the ship.
- v. Further guidance on the SRtP compliance process is provided in Annex 2 of this Bulletin. These guidelines apply to new-build ships. For existing SRtP ships or for new-build ships contracted, signed before 09 October 2018 these guidelines should be applied to the extent practicable.
- vi. General SRtP procedures should be prepared by the Company⁴ before delivery. These procedures shall be included in the Safety Management System and effectiveness assessed during the initial ISM Safety Management Certificate (SMC) audit. The procedures should have the appropriate level of detail to support the crew in system restoration and should be aligned with the other operational procedures and decision support systems.
- vii. SRtP operational manuals⁵ and procedures⁶ shall be available onboard⁷ and be part of the ship's documentation.

⁴ The "Company" is the entity responsible for the management of the ship in accordance with the ISM Code. For ships to which the ISM Code is not applicable, the Company is the Managing Owner in accordance with Section 52 of the Merchant Shipping Act.

⁵ The operational manual is normally delivered by the yard and shall include the total number of persons for SRtP activities used to achieve 1-hour time frame

⁶ The procedures are normally delivered by the owner

⁷ Ship's documents should be available in multiple locations, considering foreseen casualty scenarios

- viii. Where the SRtP operational manual and procedures are provided in electronic format, a backup arrangement (either as hard copies or in electronic form) shall also be available onboard to ensure continuous availability.

5.2. Consideration for SRtP Actions

- i. All systems that are to remain operational after a casualty should be designed in a way that eliminates or minimises the need for manual actions, as far as practicable. Manual control of specific functions can be permitted, but the scope and extent of manual actions should take into consideration the available onboard resources.
- ii. As part of the early phase activity outlined on paragraph 5.1.ii, the yard and the owner shall mutually agree on the approach of the system restoration, including achievable⁸ manual SRtP actions to be performed by the assigned crew members.
- iii. When planning the SRtP manual actions, consideration shall be given to foreseen crew fatigue level, in relation to their emergency duties during the casualty and restoration actions following the casualty.

5.3. Manual actions are considered as:

- i. Actions required to restore system capabilities after a fire or a flooding casualty within the threshold; or
- ii. Actions required to maintain the system capabilities, as needed for the duration of the SRtP voyage.

5.4. All system components that are to be operated manually, in connection with SRtP compliance, should be identified in design documentation and clearly marked onboard.

5.5. The design requirement for restoration time for essential systems (Category 1), which are needed for propelling and manoeuvring the ship back to port, is one hour. The restoration time for systems supporting the safe areas is two hours.

5.6. Decision Support System

5.6.1. Due to the operational challenges in the context of SRtP actions, SRtP procedures may be integrated with the "Decision Support System" (DSS⁹) onboard. The DSS, in electronic or paper format, will assist the crew in step by step restoration of the functionality of the systems affected by the casualty, or providing alternative functional solutions.

⁸ Achievable, based on the physical location and whether it is dependent on, or in conjunction with, another action

⁹ Decision Support System as mandated by SOLAS III/29, as amended

6. Degraded condition due to maintenance or damage

- 6.1. The Company should ensure that SRtP compliance is maintained throughout any upgrades or conversions and during extended planned maintenance work.
- 6.2. Notwithstanding paragraph 6.1, there may be situations during the ship's life that affect the ship's SRtP capability, such as unplanned maintenance, unexpected system failures, etc.
- 6.3. If SRtP capability cannot be maintained and restored within one hour, the Company shall make an application to the BMA, via the Recognised Organisation, for continued operation under the degraded conditions. It should be noted that categories 2,3 and 4 are normally designed redundant in such a way that unexpected failure should not impair the system's SRtP capability. Where any system category 1 is affected, the BMA shall be informed promptly.
- 6.4. The Company's submission to the Recognised Organisation shall provide additional information as listed, but not limited to, the below example:
 - i. operational route or proposed voyage(s);
 - ii. expected weather conditions;
 - iii. operational countermeasures or mitigation;
 - iv. expected ship's operational limitations and any impact on ship operations;
 - v. proposed actions and timescales to restore full SRtP capability;
- 6.5. The BMA recommends that predicted degraded conditions for systems of Category 1 are included in the list of operational limitations. A supportive example scenario is shown in Annex 3 of this Bulletin.
- 6.6. Noting the extensive SRtP functional requirements, the BMA recommends that systems are split into categories in line with those indicated below. The reason for splitting the systems into these categories is that the requirement for systems to remain operational in the remaining part of the ship not affected by the casualty has different implications for each of the categories.

Category 1A	Systems that provide propulsion, power, steering.
Category 1B	Navigation and communication.
Category 2	Systems related to fire safety and watertight integrity that shall remain operational across the ship (fire detection, firefighting, watertight door operation, flooding detection, bilge systems, etc.).
Category 3	Systems to support safe areas.
Category 4	Systems that shall remain in operation for a period of 3 hours to support orderly evacuation and abandonment of the ship.

6.7. Please refer to Annex 1 for further details of the system categories.

7. Training and drills

- 7.1. To ensure SRtP compliance, the crew¹⁰ must be familiar with the recovery of essential systems following a casualty incident, not exceeding the threshold.
- 7.2. Crew members tasked with carrying out SRtP manual actions, or any other SRtP task-related, are to be trained to ensure that they are familiar with the recovery control procedures in line with the correct SRtP design intentions.
- 7.3. Training shall be established by the company to ensure that all crew members tasked with SRtP duties are competent in the recovery of affected essential systems in a recovery as relevant to their SRtP duties.
- 7.4. SRtP drills shall be carried out by the crew at intervals not exceeding 3 months. "Touch drills" are acceptable for this purpose.
- 7.5. SRtP drills can be made in conjunction with other drills (i.e. fire drills) and shall be recorded in the Official Log Book.

8. Instructions to Recognised Organisations

- 8.1. In order to confirm that operational procedures for SRtP compliance are in place, the BMA requires its Recognised Organisations to issue a Form S supplement to the Passenger Ship Safety Certificate (PSSC) or Special Purpose Ship Safety (SPS) Certificate, as applicable, which will list details of the ship's compliance with the SRtP regulations.

¹⁰ Designated crew assigned to SRtP duties

- 8.2. From 01 January 2019, the Recognised Organisation that issues the ship's PSSC or SPS statutory certificates shall complete and issue a supplement (Form S¹¹) to all new build Bahamian ships that are subject to SRtP at the initial PSSC survey or initial SPS Certificate survey. Form S is provided in Annex 4 of this Bulletin.
- 8.3. From 01 July 2020, the Recognised Organisation that issues the ship's statutory certificates shall complete and issue a supplement (Form S¹¹) to all existing Bahamian ships that are subject to SRtP at the first PSSC renewal survey or SPS Certificate annual/intermediate/renewal survey.
- 8.4. At each PSSC or SPS survey of an SRtP ship, SRtP compliance shall be assessed by the attending surveyor(s) in line with SOLAS II-2/21 and 22 and this Bulletin. At each PSSC or SPS survey a SRtP drill shall be carried out and attended by the Recognized Organization. The drill can be one of those required in 7.4.
- 8.5. At the first ISM DOC audit on or after 01 July 2020, the attending auditor shall confirm that the Company, in its Safety Management System, has measures to ensure that on-board documentation, operational manuals, training, procedures and records related to SRtP are developed, implemented, monitored and revised as needed. The effectiveness of the measures shall be assessed at the first shipboard audit and the DOC renewal audit following the DOC audit mentioned above.
- 8.6. When the ship's SRtP compliance study is via FMEA or equivalent analysis, this is to be reviewed and approved on behalf of the BMA by the Recognised Organisation that classes the ship.
- 8.7. When a Company proposes any alterations, conversion or modification to a ship that otherwise does not fit the SRtP criteria of SOLAS II-2/22.1, the Recognised Organisation shall advise the Company that modifications of a major character (i.e. adding an MVZ), may require the ship to comply with SRtP regulations. The Recognised Organisation shall assess any proposed modifications and advise the BMA prior to commencement of the conversion.
- 8.8. For an existing SRtP certified ship, any modifications or refurbishments affecting the essential SRtP systems shall not impair the SRtP capabilities of the vessel. This implies that affected SRtP system assessment, operational procedures and relevant on-board documentation shall be updated and recorded.
- 8.9. For an SRtP ship in service in a degraded condition, prior to submission to the BMA, the Recognised Organisation shall review the application as per paragraph 6.4 of this

¹¹ Form S Rev.0 shall be replaced with Rev.1 at the first PSSC or SPS Survey on or after 01 February 2020

Bulletin and clearly indicate whether they are supportive, or not, and advise any relevant recommendation(s).

9. Existing SRtP ships changing flag to The Bahamas

- 9.1. From 01 July 2019, the Recognised Organisation that issues the ship's statutory certificates shall complete and issue the supplement (Form S) to all ships that are subject to SRtP at the change of flag survey.
- 9.2. The Recognised Organisation that issues the SMC shall review the Company's proposed SRtP procedures and decision support documentation.
- 9.3. When assessing an application, the Recognised Organisation that would issue the PSSC or SPS, shall take into consideration the ship's operational limitations and impacts on ship operations and make a proposal to the BMA for any exemptions and operational limitations.
- 9.4. Prior to submission of an application to the BMA the Recognised Organisation shall:
 - i. include all the required information specified in this Bulletin; and
 - ii. clearly indicate whether they are supportive, or not, of the application and advise any relevant recommendation(s).
- 9.5. The guidelines in Annex 2 of this Bulletin, although designed for new builds, may be used for existing ships to the extent practicable.
- 9.6. When a SRtP ship changes management or changes flag to The Bahamas, the Company shall demonstrate that its safety management system has measures and resources in place to support the SRtP approach at the interim/initial SMC audits.

Annex 1 – SRtP System Categories

Category 1A – Essential Systems

System	Notes
Propulsion systems and essential auxiliaries	Redundancy for propulsion, steering and electrical production will be required. Propulsion engines and electrical generators will have to be distributed in at least two separate engine rooms, as well as main switchboards and all essential auxiliaries for propulsion and electrical production being suitably segregated.
Electrical power plant and essential auxiliaries	
Steering system and its power and control systems	Two steering gear rooms have to be arranged and fitted with a fixed extinguishing system if they are adjacent. Tunnel thrusters are not to be considered for emergency steering.
System for filling, transfer and service of fuel oil	The fuel necessary for the remaining main engine(s) and diesel generators must be available in sufficient quantities for the whole SRtP voyage – the operating pattern of the ship will have an important impact on the quantity of fuel required, as a worldwide cruise ship will have different needs from a passenger ro-ro on short international voyages.

Category 1B – Essential Systems

System	Notes
Navigation systems	In case of casualty affecting the bridge, an alternative place shall be arranged where essential equipment (fixed or portable) for navigation and detection of risk of collision is available for the duration of the SRtP voyage.
Internal and external communication systems	The public-address system, arranged as general alarm, shall remain operational in all areas not affected by the fire. Portable communication systems are acceptable for internal communication, provided the repeater system remains operational and charging facilities are available in more than one main vertical zone. The ship should be capable of communicating via the GMDSS or the VHF Marine and Air Band distress frequencies, even if the main GMDSS equipment is lost.

Annex 1 – SRtP System Categories

Category 2 – Essential Systems

System	Notes
Fire main system	The fire main may be isolated in the main fire zone affected by the casualty. The affected main fire zone can then be served from hydrants of adjacent zones or watertight compartments. Fire hoses may be extended for firefighting within the affected main fire zone using two lengths of hoses from each hydrant. Manual local start of remaining fire pumps may be accepted after a casualty.
Fixed fire extinguishing systems	The layout of the sprinkler or equivalent system will have to be carefully reviewed and pumps will have to be duplicated and installed in separate compartments. Each section should not serve more than one deck in one main vertical zone. CO ₂ total flooding extinguishing system capacity to be sufficient to protect the largest space and the second largest space.
Fire and smoke detection system	The architecture of the smoke detection system may have to be modified in order to remain operational in spaces not directly affected by the fire casualty. It will be acceptable to lose detection in maximum one deck in one fire zone.
Bilge and ballast Systems	Proper distribution of bilge and ballast pumps will be necessary, as well as careful routing of the piping. Extra manual controlled section valves will be necessary when crossing watertight compartment bulkheads to segregate any flooded compartment.
Watertight and semi-watertight doors	Position indication of the doors shall remain available for any fire casualty within the casualty threshold, except for doors in the boundary of spaces directly affected by the casualty.
Flooding detection Systems	Flooding detection system to remain operation in all watertight compartments not affected by the casualty

Annex 1 – SRtP System Categories

Category 3 – Systems to be Maintained in Safe Areas, as required

System	Notes
Sanitation	A minimum of one toilet is required for every 50 persons assigned to each safe area. .
Drinking water	Minimum of 3 litres of drinking water per person per day in addition to water required for food preparation.
Food	Sufficient to maximum expected voyage under SRtP conditions
Alternate space for medical care	To be in a different main vertical zone than the hospital and to have lighting and power supply from the emergency source of power (medical equipment, medicines, etc).
Shelter from the weather	Use of exterior spaces as safe areas may be permitted where the ship is operating in warm climates.
Means of preventing hypothermia or heat stress	The temperature within safe areas should be maintained in the range of 10° to 30° Celsius (50° to 86° Fahrenheit)
Lighting not covered by the ship's emergency lighting system	Portable rechargeable battery-operated lighting may be acceptable for use in safe area spaces.
Ventilation	Minimum ventilation volume available should be not less than 4.5m ³ per hour per person, unless the safe area is allocated outside.

Annex 1 – SRtP System Categories

Category 4 - Systems to be Maintained to Support Orderly Evacuation

System	Notes
Fire main	The fire main should remain operational in all main vertical zones not directly affected by the casualty. Water for fire-fighting purposes should be available to all areas of the ship.
Internal communication for passenger and crew notification and evacuation	A means should be available for communicating orders to fire-fighting and damage control teams and personnel in charge of evacuation and abandonment.
External communication	The ship shall be able of communicating via the GMDSS or the VHF Marine and Air Band distress frequencies even if the main GMDSS equipment is lost.
Bilge system	The bilge pumping system and all associated equipment essential for its operation should be available in all other MVZ not affected by the casualty.
Evacuation and Abandonment systems	Electrical power and lighting should be available along escape routes, muster station and embarkation station for the abandonment of the ship. Particular attention shall be given to the lifesaving appliances and systems referred to in SOLAS regulation II-2/22.3.1, as may be operated at the same time.

Annex 2 – SRtP Testing Process

SRtP compliance shall be tested and documented. The SRtP test strategy should be made early in the project to ensure that necessary tests are performed efficiently at the most appropriate stage in the process.

In order to avoid extensive testing of SRtP compliance at the later stages, the tests should as far as possible be done in connection with normal system commissioning and tests. The test strategy should include a plan for when, how and to what extent it may be verified that the consequence of representative SRtP casualties (fire/flooding) does not render any of the required systems inoperable in other compartments.

If a good SRtP test strategy is made and the strategy is verified through the various phases of completion and commissioning, this may limit the extent of SRtP related tests in the later phases including quay and sea trials. The test strategy may be a part of the Ship Description document or made as a separate document. In either case, it shall be submitted to the Recognised Organisation for their preliminary review and further approval.

Certain tests are deemed necessary during trials to verify the ship's capabilities after the fire or flooding casualty scenarios. The test program for SRtP quay and sea trials shall be submitted to the Recognised Organisation for approval. This includes testing of the worst-case scenarios which normally takes the major number of manual actions (within the casualty threshold limit), this is normally considered to be loss of a complete engine room, loss of control room, possibly loss of the bridge or other critical compartments. The main purposes of running these tests are:

- (i) To demonstrate that the machinery arrangement is designed to support simultaneous availability of auxiliaries and supporting systems to enable operation of the remaining propulsion line after a casualty;
- (ii) To demonstrate that the power needed to achieve the intended speed and maintain power to all essential systems necessary to reach port may be generated without exceeding the manufacturer's recommended operational limits;
- (iii) To demonstrate that the operation is feasible and that necessary means of control and monitoring for all necessary systems are available; and
- (iv) that eventual manual actions necessary to restore and remain in operation are identified, available and manageable.

Furthermore, it is considered necessary to run a specific test to demonstrate compliance with the abandon ship scenario (SOLAS II-1/22). This includes simulating the loss of a complete (the most critical) main vertical zone and demonstrating that the required systems remain operational in the other MVZs. The "most critical zone" in this respect is normally considered to be the MVZ where a loss would have the most significant impact for the power generation and distribution system, i.e. the MVZ containing the engine rooms and switchboard rooms. This test is normally done whilst the ship is alongside and should not require any physical alteration of an SRtP equipment during testing, as this may impair the original certification issued and verified by the Recognised Organisation.

Annex 2 – SRtP Testing Process

Subject to the Recognised Organisation’s satisfaction, means of alternative testing/simulation can be considered acceptable. The numbers and the selection of SRtP scenarios are to be agreed with the Recognised Organisation but should not be less than three – for example:

- i. Loss one ER space (worst case scenario).
- ii. Loss of the Wheelhouse or ECR
- iii. Loss of galley at FZ4

The test documentation and the SRtP Manual shall include the total number of persons involved in the SRtP activities.

Annex 3 – SRtP Operational Limitation Examples

Safe Return to Port Operational Limitations, issued in conjunction with PSSC or SPSC Supplement, by **{Recognised Organisation}** under the authority of the **Government of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas**.

This is to be used for Category 1 systems only. For systems other than Category 1, please refer to the maintenance plan as applicable.

SRtP design capabilities	SRtP degraded capabilities
Distance: Speed and duration: Fuel type: Fuel capacity:	Distance: Speed and duration: Fuel type: Fuel capacity:
Degraded operational conditions: 1: (i.e. Propulsion generation reduced (Azipod unit running at 1 drive); 2: Electric power generation reduced (DG out of service); 3: reduced manoeuvrability (steering system)	
Casualty Scenario: (most probable maintenance/ damage scenario) Es. Engine# 1 under maintenances	
Degraded condition capability: Distance, speed, duration, fuel type & fuel Capacity, weather limitations.	
Operational countermeasures: 24 hours fire guards; or stand by tug support at the nearest port	
Optional: this may be included in the maintenance plan	

9.7.



**Supplement to the (PSS or SPS) Survey Certificate
Form S**

Issued by **{Recognised Organisation}** under the authority of the
Government of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas

This Supplement is to be used for ships that hold a PSS or SPS Certificate, constructed on or after 01 July 2010 having length, as defined in regulation 2.5 of SOLAS Chapter II-1, of 120 metres or more or having three or more main vertical fire zones.

This Record shall be permanently attached to the PSS or SPS Certificate and be available on board the ship at all times.

Entries in boxes shall be made by inserting either a cross (X) for answer “yes” and “applicable” or dash (-) for answer “no” and “not applicable” as appropriate.

This is to certify:

The Ship Name:

IMO Number:

Built date:

Major conversion date:

- 1. Has been surveyed and found in compliance with SOLAS II-2/21
- 2. Has been surveyed and found in compliance with SOLAS II-2/22

The ship has been issued with:

- 3. A Safe Return to Port Voluntary Compliance
- 4. A Safe Return to Port Exemption
- 5. A list of Safe Return to Port Operational limitation ship’s capabilities (refer to Annex 3)

The ship is:

- 6. Fitted Two or more independent stability computer (MSC.1/Circ.1400) (MSC.1/Circ.1532)
- 7. Fitted with a remote shore-based damage stability calculation program (MSC.1/Circ.1400)
- 8. Fitted with an alternative bridge arrangement
- 9. Fitted with two or more Safe Areas
- 10. Fitted with Alternate space for medical care

The ship has the following documentation on board:

- 11. SRtP Drill records
- 12. SRtP Operating Manual
- 13. List of SRtP manual actions is available on board
- 14. List of spaces considered having negligible fire risk
- 15. Test, inspection, and maintenance plan document.
- 16. Ship Description (MSC.1/Circ1369.Add1)
- 17. Description of essential systems operation after a casualty exceeding the casualty threshold

Annex 4 – Form S

Form S Rev1

Certificate no:
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The ship is fitted with:

- 18. paper decision support restoration program
- 19. electronic decision support restoration program
- 20. means of backup for the decision support restoration program
- Documentation confirming:
- 21. Essential System restoration can be achieved within 1 hour
- 22. Systems restoration to support the safe areas can be achieved within 2 hours
- 23. System to support the orderly evacuation and abandonment of a ship can remain operational for at least 3 hours

Maximum Distance from Safe Return to Port: (Nm)

This is to certify that this record is correct and compliant with the convention in all respects

Issued at (place), on (date)

Signed

Seal or stamp of issuing authority:

