THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS

M.v. Splendour of the Seas
IMO Number 9070632
Official Number 9000121

Report of the investigation into the forward engine room fire which occurred on the 22nd October 2015
The Bahamas conducts marine safety or other investigations on ships flying the flag of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas in accordance with the obligations set forth in International Conventions to which The Bahamas is a Party. In accordance with the IMO Casualty Investigation Code, mandated by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulation XI-1/6, investigations have the objective of preventing marine casualties and marine incidents in the future and do not seek to apportion blame or determine liability.

It should be noted that the Bahamas Merchant Shipping Act, Para 170 (2) requires officers of a ship involved in an accident to answer an Inspector’s questions fully and truly. If the contents of a report were subsequently submitted as evidence in court proceedings relating to an accident this could offend the principle that individuals cannot be required to give evidence against themselves. The Bahamas Maritime Authority makes this report available to any interested individuals, organizations, agencies or States on the strict understanding that it will not be used as evidence in any legal proceedings anywhere in the world.

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Bahamas Maritime Authority
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United Kingdom
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# 1 GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>Auxiliary Engine</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMA</td>
<td>Bahamas Maritime Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>°C</td>
<td>Celsius</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed-circuit television</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO₂</td>
<td>Carbon dioxide</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Diesel Generator</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMT</td>
<td>Diesel Maintenance Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNV-GL</td>
<td>Det Norske Veritas – Germanischer Lloyd</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECR</td>
<td>Engine control room</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEBD</td>
<td>Emergency escape breathing device</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOOW</td>
<td>Engineer officer of the watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMT</td>
<td>Greenwich mean time</td>
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<tr>
<td>HFO</td>
<td>Heavy fuel oil</td>
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<tr>
<td>HP</td>
<td>High Pressure</td>
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<tr>
<td>kW</td>
<td>Kilowatt</td>
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<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Low Pressure</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPI, Inc</td>
<td>Lucius Pitkin Incorporated</td>
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<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>Metre</td>
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<tr>
<td>m³</td>
<td>Cubic Metre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARPOL</td>
<td>International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships</td>
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<tr>
<td>MGO</td>
<td>Marine Gas Oil</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSC/Circ</td>
<td>Maritime Safety Committee circular</td>
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<tr>
<td>NM</td>
<td>Nautical mile</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nm</td>
<td>Newton Metre</td>
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<tr>
<td>OOW</td>
<td>Officer of the watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCV</td>
<td>Quick Closing Valves</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECA</td>
<td>Sulphur Emission Control Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOLAS</td>
<td>International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, as amended</td>
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<tr>
<td>STCW</td>
<td>International Convention for the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>Ultra High Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTC</td>
<td>Universal co-ordinated time</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDR</td>
<td>Voyage Data Recorder</td>
</tr>
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2.1 At 0752 on 22nd October 2015 the Royal Caribbean Cruise Limited vessel Splendour of the Seas suffered a machinery space fire on diesel generator number 1 (DG1) in the forward engine room. When the fire broke out the vessel was on passage from the Greek ports of Mykonos to Argostoli. Due to the consequences of the fire the vessel diverted directly to Venice under its own power generated using the aft engine room propulsion units only.

2.2 A few minutes prior to the fire occurring, a large fuel leak was observed from the hot box on DG1 at the forward, outboard drive end of the engine. DG1 is located on the starboard side of the forward engine room. There were two generators in use at the time each operating at 80% load.

2.3 The leakage of fuel was observed to be flowing through gaps of the hot box covers. Fuel was also spraying onto the rocker covers and was impinging on the engine exhaust manifold cladding. When the leaking fuel vapours ignited, heat was intense and smoke propagation was rapid and dense. The engine had been stopped from the Engine Control Room (ECR), 40 seconds prior to the ignition.

2.4 Within 10 seconds of the fire starting there was an attempted simultaneous release from the ECR of fixed firefighting installations Ultrafog and flexi fog. The Ultrafog system, however, did not function due to fire-damaged cables. CO2 was not deployed. During the firefighting procedures, the tank tops were smothered with foam from the fixed foam eductor system.

2.5 Code Bravo\(^1\) was initiated by the 2\(^{nd}\) engineer in charge of the 0400 to 0800 watch resulting in the fire parties mustering at their designated locations. The initial control point was in the provision area on deck 1 working alleyway (I-95\(^2\)). This was changed due to the development of smoke to the forward end of the working alleyway, adjacent to the table tennis area. Finally, the location was changed to the forward passenger stair landing on deck 2.

2.6 A total of 12 crewmembers were trapped in three workshops on deck 0 in the forward engine room during the course of the incident. These workshops are located as follows: mechanical workshop (port side deck 0), electrical workshop (starboard side forward deck 0) and deck workshop (starboard side aft deck 0). The electrical workshop is directly adjacent to the seat of the fire. The crew could not escape due to the intense heat and heavy smoke generated by the fire and remained trapped inside the respective compartments. Later they all managed to escape and suffered minor smoke inhalation in the process.

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\(^1\) Code Bravo is announced over the public-address system to indicate to all crew the presence of a fire onboard.

\(^2\) Colloquial term used to describe the main service corridor running through the vessel forward to aft, accessible to crew only, named after a large interstate (highway) in the United States of America.
2.7 Inspection revealed that number 2A fuel pump forward outboard stud was sheared and that the forward inboard nut was not in place but laying at the bottom of the hot box. The stud was found to be sheared flush at the engine frame. Both aft fuel pump securing nuts were in place and secure. The 2A fuel pump LP fuel supply and return manifold was partially open at the forward end with an open gap of 2mm. Three manifold securing bolts were sheared and lying at the bottom of the hot box. The aft lower bolt was in place and secure. The source of the fuel leak was from the open gap created by the bolts shearing on the Low Pressure (LP) manifold flange.

2.8 Of the 2626 passengers and crew onboard there were no injuries with the exception of 25 crew and 2 passengers who were treated for minor smoke inhalation. The Master determined that it was not necessary to transition to emergency stations however it did become necessary to activate the crew responsible for evacuation and crowd management in order to evacuate passengers and crew from the affected areas as efficiently as possible.

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3 DETAILS OF INVOLVED VESSEL(S) AND OTHER MATTERS

3.1 The vessel was constructed in 1996 in the Chantier De L’Atlantique Shipyard, France and at the time of the incident, was under classification with Det Norske Veritas - Germanischer Lloyd (DNV-GL). The vessel was owned by Splendour of the Seas Inc. and operated by Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited. The following principal particulars were noted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Number</th>
<th>9000121</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMO Number</td>
<td>9070632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call Sign</td>
<td>C6TZ9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built</td>
<td>Chantier De L’Atlantique, St Nazaire, France, 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length Overall</td>
<td>264.26 metre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breadth</td>
<td>32.00 metre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draught</td>
<td>7.9 metre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage</td>
<td>69472 (Gross)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonnage</td>
<td>37971 (Net)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Entry</td>
<td>Passenger Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Notation</td>
<td>DNV +1A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propulsion</td>
<td>5 x Wartsila 12V46B, 2 x 21.1 MW propulsion motors (Diesel Electric)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brake Shaft Power</td>
<td>58500.00 kW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complement</td>
<td>46 (Condition 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>2,074 passengers, 720 crew</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Condition 1 is for when the ship operates with no passengers onboard
Condition 2 is for when the ship operates with full complement of passengers onboard.
Figure 1: Splendour of the Seas general arrangement plan (GA plan of double bottom, tank top, deck 0 and starboard aspect)
3.2 The vessel is powered by five diesel-electric engines driving five generators powerng twin fixed pitch propellers at 11,700kW each. Main propulsion is supplemented by 2 bow thrusters of 1,500kW each and a 1,700kW stern thruster.

3.3 At the time of the incident the vessel was classed with Det Norske Veritas – Germanischer Lloyd (DNV-GL) and all statutory certificates remained valid.

3.4 All crew carried appropriate documentation as required by the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW). All document holders had the necessary endorsements provided by the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and complied with the vessel’s Safe Manning Document.

3.5 The vessel’s fire detection and extinguishing system met the required standards under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) requirements.

3.6 In June 2016 the vessel was sold to Thomson Cruises and renamed the m.v Tui Discovery. At the same time the vessel changed registration to the flag State of Malta.

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4.1 On the 22\textsuperscript{nd} October 2015 the Splendour of the Seas was on passage from Mykonos to Argostoli in Greece. The vessel departed Mykonos the previous day at 1529 (GMT +3). At the time of the incident the vessel was in position 37°19’N 20°50’E on a heading of 325° at a speed of 15 knots with a scheduled arrival in Argostoli at noon on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} October. The vessel was operating in Universal Co-ordinated Time (UTC+3) and all references are based upon this time zone.

4.2 There were two generators in use, DG1 in the forward engine room and DG3 in the aft engine room, each operating at 80% load.

4.3 At 0750 the 1\textsuperscript{st} Electrical Engineer observed a significant fuel leak on DG1 in the forward engine room. He reported the leakage by phone, located in the electrical workshop, to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Engineer on watch in the ECR. The 1\textsuperscript{st} Electrical Engineer then continued his duties and remained in the electrical workshop. The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Engineer on watch was instructed to inspect the reported fuel leak whilst the bridge were informed to decrease speed in order to reduce engine load by the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Engineer. The fuel leak was described by the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Engineer as “being like a waterfall flowing from open gaps on the hot box”. At this point DG2 was prepared for starting. Shortly after an alarm was registered in the ECR stating the following: [DG1 A BANK FO HP PIPE LEAKAGE] followed by [DG1 FO INLET LOW PRESSURE] and the standby [FO/DO BOOSTER PUMP STARTING]. The bilge alarm for the [FORWARD ENGINE ROOM STBD AFT BILGE WELL] also activated just prior to the fuel leakage alarm. The bilge wells are quite small and the high volume of fuel leaking down the side of the engine to the bilge could account for this alarm.

4.4 CCTV footage shows fuel spraying in the area between the rocker covers on unit’s 2A and 3A (see figure 8). The 1\textsuperscript{st} Engineer along with the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Engineer on watch observed the fuel leak which was leaking heavily out of the hot box running down the side of the engine to the bilge and instructed the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Engineer on watch in the ECR to stop the engine immediately. There is no engine emergency stop located on deck 0; it is located on the local engine control panel at the drive end of the engine. A fire hose was prepared and laid out by the 1\textsuperscript{st} Engineer but not charged or used.

4.5 The engine emergency stop button in the ECR was activated and the engine shut down. The vessel’s power was maintained by DG3 from the aft engine room. The Officer of the Watch (OW) was aware that there was only one generator on load and when his assistant asked him if he should call the Master he answered “No”, for reasons not determined during the course of the investigation. The Chief Engineer who was in the technical office adjacent to the ECR heard the noise of the engine turbo chargers surging caused by emergency stopping and immediately attended the ECR.
Approximately 40 seconds after the engine had been shutdown with the emergency stop, a fire erupted at 0752 in vicinity of the hot box between cylinders A2 and A3. Immediately the fixed installation systems were released however it was later determined that only the Heien-Larssen flexi fog system activated. The Ultrafog system had a fault due to a fire-damaged cable and did not deploy.

Dense smoke generation was rapid and was observed to encompass the complete engine room within 15 seconds. DG2, which had now started, was shut down by the emergency stop in the ECR by the Chief Engineer.

Code Bravo was announced at 0753 from the bridge and fire teams assembled shortly after. Only three fire teams could be assembled due to the number of technical crew, made up of firefighters in the event of an emergency, who were trapped within the workshops located in forward engine room.

Fuel continued to leak heavily after the emergency stopping of the engine as the quick closing fuel valves (QCV) had not been closed and the fuel booster pumps continued to run until 0755, at which point the Staff Chief on attending the ECR closed the QCV on the ECR panel. The fuel feeder pumps were stopped at 0758.

The 1st Electrical Engineer who was the first person to report the fuel leak was trapped in the electrical workshop with the Engine Foreman. He heard the noise of a turbo charger barking which would have been the engine shutting down by the emergency stop. This was followed approximately 1 minute later with the sound of gushing water, which was the flexi fog being released. When an attempt to open the workshop door was made the fire was raging outside preventing their escape. After which smoke entered the workshop through the vent duct. The vent flap was then closed followed by another attempt to open the workshop door where there was now thick black smoke but no fire. There was one EEBD in the electrical workshop but it was reported that the operating instructions were not easily identified. After an estimated 20 minutes both crew members wet their overalls with cold water and ran together through the thick smoke to the working alleyway. They reported to the Environmental Officer that they had escaped from the electrical workshop prior to making their way to their respective emergency stations.

Fire teams equipped with fire suits and breathing apparatus accessed the forward engine room to fight the fire and commenced boundary cooling. The activation of the fixed firefighting installation system significantly reduced further fire precipitation after the initial flare up. The lower level and the tank top bilges were also on fire and the fixed foam system was activated. The flexi fog and fixed foam was stopped at some undetermined stage of the proceedings.

Initially 12 crewmembers were trapped in the three workshops due to the intense heat and dense acrid smoke generated by the fire. Once alarms were activated escape from the workshops located on deck 0 in the forward engine...
room was not possible due to the rapid development of heat and smoke. There were 2 crew in the electrical workshop who were able to escape, however, 3 crew in the mechanical workshop and 7 crew in the deck workshop remained stranded in these locations for over 1 hour from the start of the fire. The 3 crew in the mechanical workshop were the last to escape at 0910 assisted by one of the fire teams who had a charged fire hose arranged for waterwall protection. The trapped crew suffered from minor smoke inhalation and were treated on board in the medical centre. In accordance with the fire control plan there is only one Emergency Escape Breathing Device (EEBD)\(^4\) located in each workshop.

4.13 The Master made an announcement over the public-address system at 0824 providing an update on the progress of the emergency situation stating that the fire was under control. He also stated that they were currently dealing with smoke extraction. This was subsequently broadcast in German, French and Italian.

4.14 At 0832 the fire was confirmed as being extinguished.

4.15 A decision was made by the Master that due to the fire being contained within the forward engine room that it was not necessary to activate the ship’s emergency signal.

4.16 At 0841 smoke eventually spread into crew and passenger accommodation on decks 1, 2, 3 and 4 necessitating the evacuation of the affected areas by the evacuation control team.

4.17 At 0851 the fire was reported to have re-established itself. The flexi fog and fixed foam application activated again. The fire was reported as being extinguished for the second time at 0931.

4.18 At 1114 the fire teams were instructed to search for hot spots before being stood down at 1200.

4.19 The vessel aborted the scheduled call to Argostoli and diverted to the port of Venice using the aft engine room propulsion units only and arrived at 0600 on Saturday 24\(^{th}\) October.

4.20 The appointed Bahamas Maritime Authority marine safety investigator attended on the vessel’s arrival in Venice and remained on board until the vessel sailed shortly after 1800. Two DNV-GL surveyors and Port State Control Inspectors from the Venice station and a salvage surveyor from Piraeus, RCCL management, technical and safety superintendent were also in attendance. The technical and safety superintendent sailed with the vessel and remained on board for the next two cruises.

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\(^4\) EEBDs are designed to provide a minimum of 10-minute supply of air to allow persons time to escape from compartments.
5 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 The marine safety investigation was conducted simultaneously to three other investigations, namely; mechanical investigation conducted by Wärtsilä the manufacturer of the engines, material failure specialists Lucius Pitkin Inc. (LPI, Inc.) instructed on behalf of the Owners to conduct material testing of the studs and bolts, and the Owners internal investigative team to determine how the vessel responded overall to the emergency. The analysis conducted and outlined below benefits from the three independent investigations conducted acknowledging the source where necessary.

FAILURE MECHANISM

5.2 The fire occurred on the engine as a result of a leaking flange from the high pressure (HP) fuel oil injection pump supplying cylinder A2, of DG1.

5.3 The fuel oil injection pump attached to the A2 cylinder is retained in place by 4, M24 studs. The manufacturer highly recommends that the 4 studs are pre-tightened to the final torque of 460Nm in steps of 100Nm. During the course of the investigation it was determined that the 4 studs were not pre-tightened in accordance with document 4610T002 (provided at Annex II) resulting in the fracture of one stud and as a consequence of increased tension, a second stud also failed. Once two of the four studs had failed, the injection pump started to move up and down due to the injection tappet force. As a consequence, the fuel inlet/return flange screws yielded and the flange started to leak.

5.4 Analysis undertaken by Lucius Pitkin Inc. (LPI, Inc.) who are independent material failure specialists determined the following: “injector pump stud 1 failed in the nature of medium to high cycle fatigue as a result of improper preloading during installation. A fatigue crack initiated at the thread root of the stud under the influence of cyclic loading at stress levels greater than the stud’s material fatigue threshold”. The detailed analysis identified the forward outboard stud was not tensioned sufficiently. The forward inboard stud failed as a result of subsequent overloading. It was also determined that the stud specification was in accordance with the designated material requirements and that the studs had not been over-tensioned.

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5 Lucius Pitkin Incorporated specialise in advanced analysis and fitness for service testing, failure of materials evaluation and non-destructive engineering.

6 Wartsila Technical Bulletin Document 4610T002 Injection Pump Foot Studs (appendix II)
Figure 2: Fuel pump indicating forward studs, inboard nut had unscrewed (1) and stud had sheared flush (2) with engine frame. Outboard nut (not visual) had sheared flush with fuel pump flange. Circled (3) indicates fuel manifold flange and source of fuel leak through 2mm gap between flanges.

Figure 3: Three manifold flange broken bolts (3) and two fuel pump stud nuts (2, 1) found loose in hot box.
HOT BOX

5.5 A hot box is designed to contain any fuel leakage within the hot box in order to avoid fuel in liquid form or fuel vapor coming into contact with a hot surface. Within the hot box there are splash guard liners which create a physical barrier between the exhaust manifold and the cylinder liners.

![Figure 4: Site survey conducted on 5th November 2015 on DG2 hotbox cover plates indicating (circled) gaps between the plates – see figure 6 for post incident damage of the same location (4).]

5.6 The hot box cover plates which provide additional containment protection from a fuel leak and are designed to keep unexpected fuel leakage contained within the hot box to ensure protection against fuel spraying onto the exhaust manifold. The overall poor condition of the hot box cover plates was confirmed by a survey conducted by Wärtsilä on the 5th November 2015 and summarized the condition of the hot box covers as follows: “quite bad condition and evidently original ones from 1994”. Figure 4 only identifies a number of air gaps in one location, the survey identified that the condition depicted above was common throughout the hot box cover plates on all five engines.
The fire started 40 seconds after the engine had been stopped from the ECR. The exact source of ignition could not be determined however there are two probable causes which could be considered as the source of ignition.
5.8 The flow of leaking fuel from the open low-pressure manifold flange was reported as being extremely heavy. The manifold fuel pressure is maintained at 8 bar and a fuel temperature of +/−118ºC when operating on IF380 fuel oil. The alarm list showed a pressure drop caused by the leaking flange which in turn prompted the stand by booster pump to start automatically. Significant amounts of fuel continued therefore to leak from the flange and fill the surrounding area of A2 both inside and outside the hot box.

5.9 The fuel leakage continued for approximately 5 minutes until the engine fuel quick closing valves were operated from the remote valve control panel in the ECR. As a result, leakage continued for another 2 to 3 minutes after the engine was stopped.

![Figure 7](image.png)

Figure 7: Picture taken two minutes prior to ignition, indicating diesel generators emergency closing of fuel oil valves

5.10 The hot box covers between A2 and A3 cylinders had an air gap which prevented the hot box from shielding any inadvertent spray and thus rendering the hot box ineffective. The fuel therefore was able to exit out of the hot box and potentially reach the exhaust manifold insulation. The source of the ignition cannot be categorically determined however evidence suggests that an opening in the exhaust insulation cladding exposing a source of heat from the exhaust manifold sufficient enough to ignite fuel vapors could be considered a likely event. Alternatively, fuel vapours leaked from the damaged fuel injection pump may have ignited on a hotspot generated by friction as a consequence of the fastening stud failures of the fuel injection pump causing a sudden explosion within the hot box.

5.11 CCTV footage shows fuel oil spraying from the closing gap on the hot box cover and impinging on the rocker cover on unit 3A and the exhaust manifold cladding.
5.12 The following sequence of synchronised images from the CCTV recordings shows the development of the fire for the first 15 seconds. The perspective from two camera locations represents the rate and extent of fire and smoke development.

At the point of ignition the fuel vapours ignited spontaneously.

Within one second the intensity reduced momentarily until the liquid heavy fuel ignited.
Two seconds after the initial ignition of vapours the fuel fire has become established

Ten seconds after initial ignition the flexi-fog was released to combat the fire

Fifteen seconds after the initial ignition the forward camera lens has melted, aft camera shows the rapid generation of acrid smoke across the engine room

5.13 As indicated in the above CCTV frames, the fire erupted and spread both vertically and horizontally away from DG1, generating thick acrid smoke in under 15 seconds. The heat generated was so intense the camera looking forward of DG1 disintegrated. The frame taken at 04:54:39 shows a dampening effect of the fire, this is believed to be the point where the flexi fog initiated to combat the effect of the fire by reducing the available oxygen and flammable vapours.

INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE

5.14 Wärtsilä attended the vessel from the 31st October until the 6th November to assess the fire damage to the engine. Their attending technician confirmed that the fuel pump studs in use were in compliance with the Wärtsilä technical bulletin 4610T002 issued on the 20th August 2001 (see appendix II). The studs in place at the time of the incident were the original studs supplied by the manufacturer of the engine. However, in 2002 the technical bulletin highly recommended to upgrade the original studs with a later version which had been modified to the extent where the strength class of 8.8, had been replaced with a special design, which incorporates better material, rolled threads and zinc coating (see figure 9). Both versions can still be used without restrictions however the manufacturer advised to inspect and even exchange the existing...
studs which had been in place for approximately 13 years. The owner placed an order for 240 replacement fuel pump studs and nuts which were delivered to the vessel in November 2002 however it is not known the extent to which the manufacturer’s recommendation had been complied with.

![Figure 9: The original stud (top) and the new replacement (below)](image)

5.15 The service history for the engine shows that seven fuel pump maintenance activities requiring pump removal had occurred since the original studs were installed in February 2004. Six of these maintenance activities were planned and one in 2007 was unplanned. The last maintenance activity requiring pump removal was carried out by the RCCL in house diesel maintenance team (DMT) in March 2015. The engine running hours when this maintenance was carried out was 89104 hrs; therefore, the fuel pump and studs have remained undisturbed for 3179 running hours.

5.16 The fuel injector from unit 2A was removed from the engine to check its operation post incident. The nozzle opening pressure was 340 bar and the spray pattern was good. The design operating pressure is 460 bar, however a reduction of 25% over the service period is not unusual. Checking the injector break point is important to ensure that no excessive loadings have been imposed upon the fuel pump studs due to a high opening pressure or restricted injector nozzle.

5.17 The engine was operating on IF380 fuel oil whilst at sea and ultra-low sulphur marine gas oil in EU ports. IF380 fuel oil needs to be heated to approximately 120°C to maintain viscosity at +/-15 centistokes. The viscometer had been changed over to manual temperature control as the viscosity measurement and control had malfunctioned. A low fuel temperature will cause a significant increase in viscosity when operating on heavy fuel, which will subsequently increase the mechanical loading on the fuel pump and studs. According to engine operating hours, engine number 1 has significantly more operating hours than the other engines by 20-30%. This indicates that the engine number 1 is frequently used as the first engine of choice. When operating in EU ports and in Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECA) in accordance with International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL) Annex VI\(^7\), fuel will be frequently changed over from HFO to MGO and vice versa. Without the viscometer in operation it is difficult to predict the temperature change required during the changeover period. The fuel temperature had been consistent at 118ºC prior to the incident and therefore can be discounted as a potential contributory factor.

**EMERGENCY PROCEDURES**

**FIREFIGHTING EFFORT:**

5.18 Members of the fire team responded quickly to the Code Bravo announcement, mustering in accordance with the pre-planned response to a fire located within the forward engine room.

5.19 A total of 12 technical crew members were trapped within the various workshops surrounding the seat of the fire (see figure 11) with no means of escape. The trapped crew reported their predicament to the bridge and engine control room by phone however it was not fully determined until after the rescue how many of the crew were trapped. The fire occurred at the start of the working day at a point where more crew congregated within their respective workshops in general, compared to any other time of the day. Each workshop was provided with one EEBD which provided 10 minutes of breathing air sufficient to enable escape for one crew member only. A sink dispensing fresh water was also available in each workshop. These two items provided some level of extra protection.

Seven crew were trapped within the deck workshop who at the time were conducting repairs to pipework within the space. All seven crew managed to escape with the help of the arrival of the first fire team. With seven crew located within the space and only one EEBD, the trapped crew had limited options but to wait until the arrival of the fire team before making a successful escape.

5.20 The 3 crew trapped in the mechanical workshop were the last to escape at 0910. Ventilation fans were configured in an attempt to reduce the smoke ingress to the compartment. Due to the excessive smoke in the workshop the trapped persons made their way into the adjacent air handling room to try and escape the smoke that had now propagated into the workshop. After just over 1 hour a fire team approached the workshop and guided them to safety behind a water wall fire hose. Only one EEBD was installed within the compartment, the trapped crew relied on respirator masks with filters and wet towels which provided sufficient protection to make a safe evacuation.

5.21 SOLAS Chapter II-2, Regulation 13 (Means of Escape) does not specify the requirement to provide adequate means of escape specifically from a

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\(^7\) Regulations for the prevention of air pollution from ships.
workshop within a machinery space\textsuperscript{8}. Had a means of escape been provided within each workshop located within the machinery space, the crew located within each space would have been able to make their own means of escape without placing themselves or the firefighters conducting the rescue in potential danger. Additionally, had adequate fire protection apparatus been provided such as firefighting suits, breathing apparatus, EEBD’s (in sufficient quantity for the number of personnel within the space) the risk of exposure to those trapped may have been reduced.

5.22 In accordance with MSC/Circ.849\textsuperscript{9} ‘unless personnel are individually carrying EEBDs, consideration should be given for placing such devices along the escape routes within the machinery spaces or at the foot of each escape ladder within the space. In addition, control spaces and workshops located within the machinery spaces should also be considered for the possible location of such devices’. Consideration was given as demonstrated with one EEBD being provided within each workshop, however what was not taken into consideration was the quantity that may be required in the event of such a scenario.

\textbf{Figure 10: Entrance to fan room in the mechanical workshop}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{8} Regulation 13 was amended by Resolution MSC.365(93) adopted in May 2014. Paragraph 4.1.6 states: ‘For ships constructed on or after 01 January 2016, two means of escape shall be provided from the main workshop within a machinery space. At least one of these routes shall provide a continuous fire shelter to a safe position outside the machinery space.’

\textsuperscript{9} Guidelines for the performance, location, use and care of emergency escape breathing devices (EEBDs)
\end{flushleft}
5.23 The fuel leak was identified by the 1st Electrical Engineer whilst conducting routine daily work enroute to the electrical workshop. Initial reaction required reporting the leak to the Engineer on Watch (EOOW) whose actions involved calling the 3rd Engineer to confirm visually and to call the 1st Engineer advising intentions to start DG2. Ninety seconds later the EOOW was ordered to shut down DG1 and commence preparations to start DG2.
5.24 Due to the delay in shutting down DG1, fuel continued to accumulate in vicinity of DG1 which, once ignited, resulted in a flash explosion. From the time the fuel leak can be seen on CCTV, to visual confirmation, reporting, and the shutting down of DG1 prior to the activation of the water suppression system (flexi fog) almost 2 minutes had passed. The immediate activation of the flexi fog system upon notification of the leak may have prevented the fire from occurring or as a minimum reduced the presence of fuel vapour in the vicinity.

5.25 Both the 3rd Engineer and the 1st Engineer were in the forward engine room before the fire occurred and confirmed the leak on DG1 visually. Both Engineers at this point could have shut down the engine locally rather than notifying the Engineer on watch had the local control been in an accessible location. The location of the local emergency stop of the engines does not allow for quick access as it is located at the end of an elevated platform between the tank top and deck 0, inaccessible from either deck.

5.26 The fixed foam system was activated twice in order to smother burning fuel on the tank top. It is estimated that 150m$^3$ of liquid accumulated in the bilges during the course of the emergency.

![Figure 13: DG1 local control panel and emergency stop](image-url)
5.27 The vessel is fitted with four fixed firefighting applications, CO2, flexi fog, Ultrafog and fixed foam. The Master decided CO2 was not deemed necessary, a decision based on the severity of the fire and the speed in which it was extinguished and the fact that 12 crew were trapped within technical spaces inside the machinery space. Flexi fog operated successfully and provided the primary means of containing and extinguishing the fire.

5.28 The third firefighting application, Ultrafog was retro-fitted on board in 2014. It was determined after the fire that the system had not operated as designed. Class had attended on the 26th November 2014 and approved the installation of the system and that it was in accordance with the approved drawings however at the time of the fire the system had not been commissioned. The Ultrafog is an additional water mist system fitted in addition to and not in place of flexi fog. It was determined that the fire had damaged the control cables of the Ultrafog system preventing it from operating as designed. The control cables pass through the machinery space and within 2 meters of DG1 which is in contravention to SOLAS Chapter II-2, Regulation 10 which states: ‘Pumps, other than those serving the fire main, required for the provision of water for fire-extinguishing systems required by this chapter, their sources of power and their controls shall be installed outside the space or spaces protected by such systems and shall be so arranged that a fire in the space or spaces protected will not put any such system out of action.’ It cannot be determined whether this addition fixed application system, had it operated as designed would have impacted the time taken to extinguish the fire. It could be considered however that it would have only aided the situation, in all likelihood reduced the severity of the fire and reduced the time taken to rescue the trapped crew.

TRAINING

10 Chapter II-2, Regulation 10 Part C Suppression of fire
The last fire drill conducted in the forward engine room was in May 2014, approximately 18 months prior to the fire. The following drills had been carried out in technical spaces over the preceding 2 months:

7th September 2015 – Engine control room
3rd September 2015 – Incinerator room
23rd August 2015 – Switchboard room
20th August 2015 – Port separator room

Despite no drills taking place within the forward engine room since May 2014, the three fire teams demonstrated a sufficient knowledge and familiarity of equipment and layout of the space to provide an effective means of protection during crew evacuation from the technical workshops. This is likely to be testament of the training delivered on board and professionalism of the firefighting team members.

SMOKE CONTAINMENT

The original forward control point was selected in vicinity of I-95 provision area. As smoke migrated outside of the forward engine room the forward control area was moved further forward to the end of I-95 before being finally relocated to the forward guest staircase on deck 2. The decision to relocate the forward control point was made out of necessity in order to maintain the function of the forward control point. It proved increasingly difficult to contain the smoke in the forward engine room as the fire doors remained open to allow access to the fire teams whilst transiting into and out of the machinery space. In addition, with 12 crew members trapped within the technical workshops, ventilation could not be crash stopped. This maintained a positive air pressure within the machinery space ultimately forcing the smoke outside the space. As smoke spread throughout the forward section of I-95 and into passenger cabins on decks 2 and 3 the Command initiated a full evacuation of all cabins on deck 1, 2, 3 and 4.

The Environmental Officer stated that watertight doors located on I-95 were closed approximately 10 minutes after the fire started. The accuracy of this statement cannot be corroborated by the bridge log as there is no record of any fire or watertight doors being closed remotely from the bridge. All fire and watertight doors can be closed locally however this does take longer than closing remotely and as such allows more time for smoke to migrate without obstruction.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) recording on the bridge confirms that the Master was not informed in the first instance of a fuel leak on DG1 or that the ECR had requested to shutdown DG1 despite the requirement existing with
the Captain’s Standing Orders and vessel’s SMS fire procedures. This ultimately delayed the amount of time the Master had to react to the developing situation.

5.33 It was clear to those crew members responsible for evacuation and crowd management that it would only be a matter of time before the emergency signal would be given and they would be required to not only control the evacuation of crew and passengers from the affected area (decks 1, 2, 3 and 4 cabins within affected fire zone), but to initiate the whole ship emergency evacuation plan. The emergency signal was not sounded which is a deviation from the vessel’s SMS, this caused significant confusion for passengers and crew alike who were being informed to evacuate the affected area and muster at their respective assembly stations by the evacuation control team. There are no procedures in place to aid the evacuation control team when attempting to muster only a proportion of crew and passengers from the affected area. A controlled muster was hampered further when those passengers and crew went to their respective assembly stations only to find passengers and crew not affected by the emergency enjoying the facilities provided for during normal cruising.

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The primary causal factor which resulted in a fire was the failure of the fuel pump securing stud, which had not been tensioned correctly during fuel pump maintenance procedures. The development of this failure could have been prevented if a follow up procedure was adopted in accordance with the manufacturers recommended practices which required re-tensioning after initial fitting and operation of the fuel pump. Had this procedure been in place the under tensioned stud is likely to have been identified and corrective action taken to rectify by applying the correct torque of 460Nm.

The independent survey conducted of the hot box covers confirmed their poor condition and identified several locations where full containment could not be achieved. If the hot box covers had been in a condition deemed ‘fit for purpose’ it could be considered highly likely that any fuel leak could be contained preventing the fuel coming into contact with the exhaust manifold, the only known heat source. As the source of ignition point cannot be categorically determined, the catalyst for igniting the fuel may have come from another source within the vicinity of the fuel pump on A2 cylinder.

With the frequent need to change fuel grades from heavy fuel to ultra-low sulphur MGO, the importance of having viscosity control equipment in a serviceable condition cannot be over emphasised. Running an engine on heavy fuel with a low fuel temperature significantly increases fuel pump loading, which is imparted to the securing studs.

The rapid deployment of the flexi fog system upon discovering the fire stopped any further development of the fire and reduced the scale of damage sustained to the forward engine room. Had the flexi fog system been deployed immediately upon discovering the fuel leak, the probability of ignition would have been significantly reduced.

The engine quick closing valves remained open after the engine had been shut down. The valves are activated independently from the shut down on the engine. Therefore in order to stop the fuel supply, regardless of the operational status of the engine, the fuel quick closing valves must be activated. The delayed response in activating the valves increased the severity of the fire and the subsequent damage sustained to the forward engine room.

The location of the engine local emergency stop prevented the operator from shutting down the engine quickly due to the location of the local control panel. Although the engine was shut down prior to the fire, as the exact source of ignition remains unknown, it cannot be determined what impact the delay in shutting the engine down had moments before ignition.

When a problem is reported to the engineer in the ECR there are inevitable delays while appropriate permissions are requested to adjust the machinery
configuration. The engineer in the ECR advised the Officer of the Watch of the need to reduce speed due to a mechanical fault with DG1. Procedures are in place before taking power and ultimately speed away from the bridge in order that navigational safety can be maintained. However, the EOOW should communicate the severity of the situation which unless acted on, may result in catastrophic loss of equipment. Although permission was granted to shut down DG1, a sense of urgency was not conveyed which may explain why the Master was not notified immediately.

6.8 An appropriate level of consideration was not given to the safety of crew working within technical spaces within the forward engine room. The Splendour of the Seas was not required to provide a means of escape from these workshops, however, a risk assessment should have identified that in the event of an engine room fire within the machinery space, adequate safety equipment should be provided to enable an escape for the total capacity of persons permitted within each space and reflected on the fire control plan. Adequate training should be provided on the provision of this equipment. It was reported that although an insufficient number of EEBD’s were available for the number of individuals trapped, those that did utilise the EEBD were not able to get them to work as designed. It is not known whether this was through inadequate training and understanding of equipment or the EEBD was faulty. Additionally, it remains unknown whether routine escape drills for crew members working in the forward engine room were accomplished regularly.

6.9 Machinery space fire drills were conducted regularly in all but the forward engine room. Fire drills are designed to not only improve the skills, knowledge and confidence of the fire teams but also improve the skills required to control, coordinate and communicate up and down the emergency organisational structure. The lack of a drill within the forward machinery space may have contributed to the slow reaction in conducting an immediate emergency procedure in the event of an engine fire, closing of the quick closing valves. Closing of the fuel quick closing valves should be second nature, to achieve this, procedures must be rehearsed robustly.

6.10 The failure to close fire and watertight doors early in the emergency allowed significant smoke propagation to decks 1, 2, 3 and 4, influencing the location of the forward control point and increasing demand on the already reduced fire teams. Further, had the fire spread, it would have become increasingly more difficult and demanding on the emergency organisation to contain the spread of the fire.

6.11 In general, the actions of the crew and the tenacity displayed, particularly by the fire team members in responding to this incident should be commended.

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Recommendations for the operator:\(^{11}\):

7.1 Ensure adherence to manufacturer’s technical bulletin No. 4610T002 specifically in relation to the replacement and tensioning of fuel pump studs.

7.2 Ensure all engine hot box covers are renewed or repaired so that no seal joint gaps exist.

7.3 Consider installing additional engine emergency stop switches at a suitable and accessible location.

7.4 Consider scheduling a thermo-graphic survey on all vessels throughout the fleet to identify any exposed areas where the temperature exceeds 220ºC and implement a rectification programme as necessary.

7.5 Consider a fleet wide review of emergency escape equipment in sufficient numbers in all workshops and offices within engine rooms. Provide enhanced training on the correct operation of emergency equipment in accordance with SOLAS II/2 Regulation 15 paragraph 2.2.2.

7.6 Consider fleet wide review for the allocation and frequency of emergency fire and escape drills for crew members onboard.

7.7 Consider implementing a prudent safety enhancement to incorporate the operation of the quick closing fuel valves with the engine emergency stop function.

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\(^{11}\) Recognising that the vessel is no longer operated by Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines some of the recommendations are directed towards the fleet of existing vessels operated by RCCL. Recommendations in general are for the benefit of all vessel to incorporate as deemed necessary.
LIST OF APPENDICES

I. Wärtsilä Site Survey Conclusions and Recommendations

II. Wärtsilä technical bulletin 4610T002

III. Lucius Pitkin LPI, Inc. Evaluation of Failed Fasteners Conclusions and Recommendations

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Appendix I: Wärtsilä Site Survey Conclusions and Recommendations

3 CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Failure mechanism

The sequence of the unwanted events was started from the failure of the injection pump stud. Evidently one of the studs has fractured first and the second one as a consequence of increased tension. Once two out of four studs failed, the injection pump started moving up and down due to the injection tappet force. As a consequence the fuel inlet/return flange screws yielded and the flange started to leak.

3.2 Cause of the fire

The engine has been designed to keep an unexpected fuel leakage inside the hot box. The hot box is not hermetically sealed space but it is designed to prevent the leakage spraying into the exhaust manifold. In this incident the hot box covers between cylinders A2 and A3 had too much air gap between each other. The same condition was observed in many of the covers in all other four engines as well. The fuel spray was able to exit out of the hot box, reaching all the way to the exhaust manifold insulations. The location of the ignition cannot be seen in the surveillance video clip, but evidently it was somewhere in the exhaust manifold. Alternatively, it is also possible that the leaked fuel has been vaporized inside the hot box and there has been a local hot spot as a consequence of the fuel injection pump damage. Once the hot box cover has been hot enough, the vaporized fuel has exploded inside the hot box. Unfortunately the hot box covers were in too bad condition for drawing a conclusion between an external and internal explosion.

3.3 Restoring the engine back in operation

In the mechanical point of view the engine itself did not suffer massive destruction. The most expensive damages are the renewal of the whole resilient mounting, engine automation plus few of the more expensive components, such as the speed governor and mechanical over speed trip device. The engine re-building can be started as soon as the engine room has been cleaned and the operation of the over-head cranes and engine auxiliary systems have been restored. The engine automation system requires a full re-commissioning.

4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Hot box inspections should be made regularly for any leakages, loosened screws, nuts etc. The hot box covers and their seals should be kept in such condition that a possible fuel spray cannot escape out from the hot box uncontrollably.

5 APPENDICES

Excel spreadsheet for necessary spare parts (main list + optional spares)
Slideshows regarding the condition of the hot boxes in the other engines.
Appendix II: Wärtsilä technical bulletin 4610T002

Injection pump foot studs

Pretightening

This After Sales Information document is intended to make the operators more aware of the importance of the proper pre-tightening procedures of the high pressure fuel injection pump holding down studs. It is highly recommended to do the pre-tightening of the studs' nuts M24 crosswise and in steps of 100 Nm to the final torque of 450 Nm.

Increased safety margins

In order to increase the safety margins in such a fatigue load application and thus to minimize the possible consequential damages the design of the studs M24 x 230 has been modified.

The original specification according to DIN 933, strength class 8.8, has been replaced with a special design, which incorporates better material, rolled threads and zinc coating.

It is highly recommended at the next possible opportunity to change the studs to the latest design and apply the proper tightening procedures.

Please check the availability with your nearest Wärtsilä Service station.

Fig. 1 Fuel pump holding down studs
Spare part number 100 153
4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Results of this evaluation indicated that injector pump stud 1 failed in the nature of medium to high cycle fatigue as a result of improper preloading during installation. A fatigue crack initiated at the thread root of the stud under the influence of cyclic loading at stress levels greater than the stud material’s fatigue threshold. The fatigue crack propagated through the stud cross-section until the remaining cross-section could no longer withstand the applied cyclic loading and final overstress fracture occurred. The large area of fatigue crack propagation of 90% to 95% of the stud cross-section also indicated that the cyclic loads were relatively low and the stud had not had significant preload.

Bolted connections are generally preloaded close to the fastener’s yield strength. The purpose of a large preload is to prevent separation between the bolted joint members. As long as no separation occurs the stud only experiences a fraction of the cyclic loading during service due to the stiffness ratio between stud and members. Insufficiently pre-loaded connections experience separation during service. When separation occurs the stud has to sustain the full cyclic service loading and fatigue failures occur.

Examination of the flange bolts revealed that the bolts failed at relatively high cyclic stresses in the nature of low cycle fatigue as a result of excessive loading after the stud failure.

Mechanical testing of failed and intact studs from the subject failure as well as new studs indicated no signs of significant stud overtightening. If steels are stretched beyond their yield point during preloading, an upward shift in the yield point occurs due to strain hardening of the material. A significant shift was not observed in the tested studs, thus overtightening of the bolt material could be ruled out. In addition, the stud and bolt mechanical properties and composition conformed to the applicable requirements.
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd.
Attention: [redacted]

December 18, 2015
Report No. [redacted]

In conclusion, injector pump stud 1 failed as a result of improper preloading during the stud installation causing the bolted connection to separate under the influence of cyclic service loading and fatigue fracture to occur. Therefore, LPI recommends reviewing preloading procedures to ensure proper stud preloads. In addition, LPI further recommends reviewing and recalibrating all equipment utilized during stud preloading.

Respectfully submitted,

LPI INC.