THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS

“LEGACY”
IMO Number  9265847
Official Number  730893

Report of the investigation into grounding
at Lynyard Cay, Abaco Island, Bahamas,
9th November 2011
The Bahamas Maritime Authority investigates incidents at sea for the sole purpose of discovering any lessons which may be learned with a view to preventing any repetition. It is not the purpose of the investigation to establish liability or to apportion blame, except in so far as emerges as part of the process of investigating that incident.

It should be noted that the Bahamas Merchant Shipping Act, Para 170 (2) requires officers of a ship involved in an accident to answer an Inspector’s questions fully and truly. If the contents of a report were subsequently submitted as evidence in court proceedings relating to an accident this could offend the principle that a person cannot be required to give evidence against himself. The Bahamas Maritime Authority makes this report available to any interested parties on the strict understanding that it will not be used as evidence in any court proceedings anywhere in the world.

Date of Issue: 9th August 2013

Bahamas Maritime Authority
120 Old Broad Street
LONDON
EC2N 1AR
United Kingdom
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1 SUMMARY

1.1 The LEGACY was on passage from Nassau, Bahamas to Marsh Harbour, Abaco, Bahamas on the 9th November 2011 with a crew of nine persons along with nine passengers and a general cargo.

1.2 In the early evening period and soon after darkness fell, the vessel was attempting to enter the North Bar Channel, located at the north end of Lynyard Cay to make the inner passage to Marsh Harbour.

1.3 At approximately 1813 hrs. the vessel grounded on the north shore of Lynyard Cay in alleged rough swell conditions, possibly as a result of Tropical Storm - SEAN, which had formed in the Atlantic Ocean.

1.4 A co-ordinated rescue effort involving the Bahamas Air Sea Rescue Association, Royal Bahamas Defence Force, Marsh Harbour police and a United States Coastguard helicopter rescued the entire complement of passengers and crew from the stranded vessel. The vessel remained aground until she was re-floated on the 13th November. There were no reported injuries to either passengers or crew.

1.5 The LEGACY was towed to Freeport, Grand Bahama for repair.

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2 PARTICULARS OF VESSEL

2.1 The LEGACY is an Inter-Island (Home Trade) roll on / roll off vessel registered at Nassau, Bahamas, of welded steel construction and having a bow ramp and small below deck cargo hold. The accommodation and machinery spaces are situated aft. She has the following principal particulars:

- Official Number - 730893
- IMO Number - 9265847
- Year of Build - 2002
- Length overall - 43.98 m
- Breadth - 10.97 m
- Depth - 3.35m
- Gross Tonnage - 485 tonnes
- Net Tonnage - 145 tonnes
- Deadweight - 600 tonnes
- Call Sign - C6S-2077

2.2 The ship is powered by twin medium speed Caterpillar main engine that develop 530 kW (721 bhp) and which drive two fixed four-bladed propellers. The vessel has twin rudders and has no bow thruster.

2.3 The vessel was built in 2002 in Alabama USA. At the time of the incident, she was owned by Ernest Dean of Dean Shipping, Nassau, Bahamas.

2.4 The vessel is registered under the Bahamas Flag and was entered with the Lloyds Register Classification Society. At the time of the casualty, the vessel did not fully comply with statutory and international requirements and certification.

2.5 LEGACY was last subjected to a Bahamas Maritime Authority Annual Inspection at the Port of Nassau, on the 17th June 2008. Therefore at the time of the incident it was over 3 years overdue her BMA Annual Inspection.

2.6 The trading schedule of the vessel is attached as Appendix VII to this report.

2.7 List of crew and passengers at the time of the incident is attached as Appendix I to this report.

2.8 The Master held a Bahamian Class II/A Operators certificate.
2.9 The Chief Engineer did not hold a Bahamian Certificate, but did hold others issued by various countries including Jamaica.

2.10 No other crew member held any form of Officer’s licence as required by the Safe Manning Document (SMD), which is attached as Appendix VIII to this report.

2.11 The Safe Manning Document on board the vessel required a minimum of 6 crew members:
- Master STCW:II/3
- Chief Mate STCW:II/3
- Chief Engineer STCW:III/3
- 1 off Seaman (Category 1)
- 2 off Seaman (Category 3)
(6 crew in total)

2.12 Although the SMD was issued by the Bahamas Maritime Authority on 12 September 2002, it was not confirmed whether the Master, Chief Officer or Chief Engineer had valid STCW Certificates or Certificates of Equivalent Competency issued by the Flag Administration.

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3 NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

3.1 The following narrative is based on an interview with the vessel’s Master and helmsman, who comprised the bridge team at the time of grounding. Documentary evidence was taken on-board on 17th and 18th November 2011 and AIS data supplied by the BMA was also examined.

3.2 All times stated are local Bahamas times (GMT -5 hours.)

3.3 The vessel departed from the port of Nassau at approximately 04:50 on the morning of 9th November, having loaded general cargo below deck and on deck. Additionally nine passengers were embarked. All cargo and passengers were bound for Marsh Harbour on Abaco Island.

3.4 The normal passage time, given the vessel’s sea speed of 8 to 8.5 knots is 13 hours from Nassau to Marsh Harbour, via a section of open-ocean and the North Bar channel.

3.5 The stated drafts of the vessel on departure from Nassau were as follows:-
Forward: 7.00 Feet, Amidships: 6.75 Feet, Aft: 6.50 Feet. Therefore the vessel’s trim was 0.5 Feet by the head.

3.6 The Master is a Bahamian, residing in Nassau, and was 27 years of age at the time of the incident. He was trained MPT in Fort Lauderdale USA and held a Bahamian Class II/A Certificate. He had been with Dean Shipping for four years and Master of LEGACY for one year. Prior to this he spent six years in the commercial fishing industry in the Bahamas. He stated he knew Bahamian waters well.

3.8 The Chief Officer is Bahamian and only holds an A/B License; the watches were shared between him and other A/B’s. The Chief Engineer held a valid Jamaican Class 4 Engineering License. Neither party were on duty at the time of the incident.

3.9 The A/B / Helmsman, who also acted as Freezer Engineer, held an AB Certificate and was on the bridge with the Master at the time of the incident.

3.10 The Master had reviewed the weather forecast in Nassau using his own laptop computer. He used “Barometer Bobs” website for the latest local weather forecasts and while he was aware of the formation of tropical storm Sean he did not consider it any threat as it was a long way away.

3.11 The forecast for the local area was for NE winds 15-20 knots with seas 6-8 feet, which was not unusual for the area in question at this time of year.
3.12 After departing from Nassau weather conditions were moderate NE winds with 4-6 foot seas and no swell.

3.13 The Master was on the Bridge for most of the day during the northbound passage from Nassau going about his daily business. The vessel was in auto pilot for the sea passage and was fitted with twin Garmin GPS Plotters and two radars. The courses were set out between the relevant waypoints on the GPS Plotters and the vessel was kept “on the line” of the GPS Plotter with manual alterations of the autopilot system.

3.14 The ship was provided with charts for the passage, US Chart 26300 dated March 15th 2003. No corrections were noted on this chart. A larger scale chart 26321 was also provided on-board but was not in use at the time.

3.15 The chart was annotated with courses from Nassau to Marsh Harbour via the northern approach Man-O-War channel. There was no course marked which deviated into the more southerly entrance via North Bar Channel. North Bar Channel was favoured due to higher swell conditions being experienced in Man-O-War channel which lay further to the north of Abaco Island.

3.16 About half way through the northbound passage the swell from the NE direction increased to 8 to 10 feet and was 1 or 2 points on the starboard bow, the vessel was rolling and pitching moderately, but nothing unusual, and wind conditions remained at moderate NE.

3.17 Approximately 2 miles to the East of North Bar channel the Master executed an almost 90 degree turn to port to bring the vessel on a westerly heading for the inbound passage through the North bar channel. The Master took the helm himself and switched over from auto pilot to manual steering. With its twin rudders the vessel was steering easily with an 8 to 10 foot swell coming in on the starboard quarter.

3.18 As darkness began to fall the vessel was approaching the North Bar channel when the Master reported being subject to two very large swells of about 20 feet in height which hit the vessel from astern and pushed the vessel 150-200 feet to the port side and caused her to lose steerage control.

3.19 The vessel grounded at about 18:10 on the shallow coral shoal at the north end of Lynyard Cay with the bow in a northerly direction.

3.20 The Master issued an Emergency stations order to the passengers and crew who were told to don lifejackets and he also placed a MAYDAY call through channel 16 VHF which was answered by BASRA at Hope Town and the Marsh Harbour Police.
3.21 A United States Coastguard helicopter was scrambled from the nearby AUTEC naval military installation on Andros Island and proceeded to the casualty.

3.22 The swells coming over the reef continued to pound the vessel and swivel her around 90 degrees to port, causing damage to the keel and stern areas.

3.23 A small electrical fire in a light fitting at the aft end of the vessel was extinguished by the crew.

3.24 The crew cleared a space on the top of the bridge deck (Monkey Island) to allow helicopter transfer.

3.25 Once the helicopter arrived, aircrew were winched down to the vessel with a basket and all passengers were airlifted off and transported to Marsh Harbour. The helicopter then returned to the vessel and airlifted all crew off to safety by 20:21 and also transferred them to Marsh Harbour.

3.26 Once the swell conditions had reduced the following morning a skeleton crew went back by boat to the grounded vessel to assess the situation. The vessel having been pushed further and further over the reef in a generally SW direction. The sea conditions over the reef can be gauged in the photograph below.

![Legacy aground in North Bar Channel](image)

3.27 After various attempts by local tugs were made to tow the vessel free, the vessel was finally refloated on 13th November and towed to Marsh Harbour. The actions of the towing tug caused further damage to the stern of the vessel and deck fittings.
3.28 After remaining at Marsh Harbour awaiting a further towing tug the LEGACY was towed to Freeport, Grand Bahama for docking and subsequent repair.

3.29 It is understood that there were no personal injuries reported by either passengers or crew during the grounding and abandon ship events.

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4 ANALYSIS

4.1 In analysing the grounding incident as a whole the following specific items were considered:

- North Atlantic hurricanes
- The prevailing weather conditions and forecasts
- The route chosen
- The navigation process
- The bridge management team

4.2 The subsequent abandonment procedures and re-float operation can also be analysed and reviewed. The general vessel condition, management and manning is also worthy of analysis.

4.3 The vessel is a regular trader in the area and the ports visited although small are suitable for this size of vessel and draft.

4.4 The Bahamas islands are at the extreme NE corner of the wider Caribbean area and as such are exposed, particularly on its Eastern side, to swell conditions from the entire North Atlantic area.

4.5 The Atlantic hurricane season generally commences on June 1st and ends on November 30th although named storms have formed and been active outside of this seasonal norm.

4.6 Tropical storms that may intensify to hurricane status that affect the Bahamas commonly form near the Cape Verde islands. Tropical storms generally take a Westerly heading across the southern latitudes of the Atlantic and carry straight on to the Caribbean, Bahamas and US East coast or “re-curve” in a Northerly direction to the higher North Atlantic.

4.7 The graphic below is a historical record of tropical storms and hurricanes which formed in the 2011 Atlantic season.
4.8 As can be seen in the above graphic, many storms passed to the east or close to The Bahamas. Tropical storm “Sean” which is relevant to this incident and report is numbered 19 in this graphic.
4.9 The result of these storms passing to the east of the Bahamas is that significant swells can be generated from the NE to SE sector, caused by tropical storm force winds generated from the storm centres further away to the East.

4.10 These swells can travel significant distances and have heights in excess of 6 metres. These swells can also increase in height when nearing land masses due to shallow water friction effects when passing over the continental shelf and into reduced water depths.

4.11 Tropical Storm “Sean” formed on 6th November 2011 and the synoptic history is set out below (courtesy of the National Hurricane Centre, Miami)

4.12 The track of Tropical Storm “Sean” is set out in the below graphic:
4.13 The wind speed is set out in the below graphic;

![Wind Speed Chart]

4.14 As can be seen from the above data, tropical storm force winds in excess of 45 knots were described in the early stages with an increasing strength tendency.

4.15 A significant issue of “Sean” is that it was initially very slow moving which resulted in a continued same wind direction and swell generating mechanism to remain in a relatively small area. This has the effect of increasing the swell effect at any given land mass nearby.

4.16 It is clear that the Master was aware of the proximity of “Sean” from the forecasts received whilst in Nassau prior to the commencement of the voyage to Marsh Harbour. What is unclear is what priority the Master attached to possible swell conditions that would be experienced at the destination of Marsh harbour given that the entrance lies on the exposed eastern side of Abaco Island.

4.17 Swell is notoriously difficult to forecast with any degree of accuracy and it is generally the decision of the Master to analyse the weather data received in order to plan an upcoming passage and route accordingly and taking into account the size, power and limitations of his own vessel.

4.18 Having reviewed “Barometer Bob’s” weather webpage, which is commonly used in the Inter Island trade, the information provided is significant and extensive with information being provided by a number of national weather centres and with extensive links to other weather sites. The information provided is
substantial enough for any Mariner to be able to analyse and plan a voyage accordingly.

4.19 The Master believed that the passage through the North Bar channel would be more appropriate than the more Northerly entrance to Marsh Harbour through North Man of War Channel as his past experience showed higher sea conditions through this more northerly approach entrance.

4.20 The North Bar channel is situated to the north of Lynyard Cay and to the south of Pelican Cays and leads into Pelican harbour where a sheltered transit can be made to Marsh harbour. The Master stated he had made this passage without incident on numerous occasions.

4.21 The North Bar channel is for use of small craft only with local knowledge and shallow draft as can be seen from the below extract from Chart BA3910.

4.22 The extract for Pelican harbour is set out below from the Admiralty Sailing directions NP70.

Pelican Harbour 4.141
Pelican Harbour is entered through North Bar Channel - 2 cable S of Channel Rock (26°24'N 76°59'W), and is one of the few sheltered pools within the Abaco Cays that are accessible to ocean-going vessels. It was formerly a timber loading station and is now a nature reserve. Local knowledge is required.

4.23 The vessel used several American charts for the area, it was noted that no corrections had been made to any of these charts. The principal chart for this
passage is shown below where a well-worn track is marked between Nassau and Marsh Harbour. It is noted that no reference is made to the use of the North Bar Channel on this passage plan and only the more northerly Man o’ War channel is used;

4.24 The relevant American chart shows leading beacons situated at the North Bar channel which, if correct and followed, would allow a clear passage through safe water on a course of 290° True.
4.25 If the method of navigation used by the LEGACY was to follow a predetermined course to be made good on the GPS Plotter, it would make perfect sense for this route to follow the 290° course as marked by the leading beacons especially during the hours of darkness when these marks are not visible as there are no lights. As can be seen by the above chart the shallow water reef (where the vessel grounded) extends northwards from the northern extremity of Lynyard Cay and also shows a general current flow almost in line with the leading marks;

4.26 The area in this vicinity would probably make radar navigation useful and beneficial in plotting the vessels position, particularly in the approach to the Channel, although it is not known if radar was used as a primary or secondary navigation aid.

4.27 Relevant AIS plots for the voyage in question which shows the track of the LEGACY up to and including the grounding incident and is shown as follows;
4.28 The alteration of course position at 2256hrs (GMT) from the Northerly to Westerly course is 1.8 nautical miles from the grounding position.

4.29 Analysis of the AIS track (in blue) and then superimposed the leading mark direction of 290° (in Red) onto the image as shown below.

4.30 The red leading mark line shows what would have been a safe track to follow, however analysis of the AIS track reveals what is a steady vessel course over the ground and one which leads the vessel direct into the reef area at the north end of Lynyard cay. At some point along the given AIS track, course should have been adjusted to follow the 290° leading mark through safe water but it appears the vessel carried on the course made good from the alteration point at 2256 hrs (GMT).
4.31 Analysis of the navigation process shows that the Master was conning the vessel without appropriate position plotting to ensure the vessel was maintaining the correct safe track. There did not appear to be another duly qualified individual to assist in the navigation process on the bridge.

4.32 There was no course recorder or VDR information available to this investigation, nor any log or bell book record of the track being followed.

4.33 There appears to be no indication that the vessel was *pushed* by the swell at the final moments of the inbound transit in view of the fact that a steady track over the ground was maintained right into the reef area.

4.34 The subsequent abandonment of the vessel was made safely and appeared to have been well controlled by the Master and crew resulting in no loss or injuries. It is probably fortuitous that a USCG helicopter was available to perform the necessary evacuation.

4.35 The re-floating operation was successfully carried out by the crew with the use of tugs and although some damage did occur as a result of the tugs actions, the vessel was eventually brought safely to port.

4.36 Photographs of the visible damage are attached as Appendix IV to this report

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5 CONCLUSIONS

5.1 In the absence of any crew documents on board, it was not possible to confirm that the vessel was manned in accordance with the Safe Manning Document.

5.2 Had the BMA Annual Inspection been carried out within the BMA Annual Inspection window (Anniversary Date: 15 Oct), issues relating to Safe Manning and Certificate verification could have been addressed. It is the responsibility of the Manager/Owner to arrange Annual Inspections.

5.3 The weather conditions at the time no doubt played a role in this casualty but were not the primary factor in the causation of the grounding.

5.4 The Master should have been aware that significant swell would be experienced as he headed further north given the intensity and location of tropical storm “Sean” and the bathymetric conditions at the east side of Abaco island where the water depth reduced significantly from Ocean depths and would cause an increase in swell height.

5.5 The vessel’s heading or course to be made good in the approach and entrance to the North Bar Channel from the time of the alteration of course at 17:56 does not appear to be appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions of swell which would have the effect of pushing the vessel to the south given the shallow draft and construction of the vessel.

5.6 The primary method of Navigation appeared to be the GPS Plotter but no secondary method of position fixing was used.

5.7 There was no suitably qualified individual on the bridge to assist the Master in a passage which held a high degree of risk in the prevailing circumstances and conditions and during the hours of darkness.

5.8 Over emphasis and reliance was placed on electronic navigation and the vessel’s track over the ground was not correctly monitored.

5.9 The two large swells experienced were as a result of the vessel passing over the reef edge and were not directly attributable to causing the vessel to ground at the location she did, indeed the AIS track shows a continued track made good directly onto the reef area from the point at which alteration of course was made at 17:56.

5.10 The lack of proper navigation records, uncorrected navigational charts and uncertified bridge team members showed a systemic failure in good navigation and management practices aboard the vessel.
5.11 Regardless of the size of vessel, familiarity with the vessel and local passages, good navigational practices have not been followed and if such practices would have been in place this incident should have been avoided.

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6 RECOMMENDATIONS

MANAGERS

6.1 The Managers should make arrangements in good time to ensure the vessel is Inspected Annually in accordance with section 172 of the Bahamas Merchant Shipping Act.

6.2 The Managers should ensure that all Officer and Crew fulfil the requirements of the Safe Manning Document issued to the vessel.

6.3 The vessel’s management system should be fully reviewed, both on certification, quality of bridge watch-keeping and standard practices in safely operating a vessel in all conditions likely to be experienced in the day to day operation.

6.4 The certification of the vessel should be evaluated and all required surveys completed.

6.5 Standing orders should be instigated and posted for navigation procedures and safe manning in coastal transits.

6.6 Navigation charts and publications should be corrected and updated.

6.7 Navigational equipment should be overhauled, calibrated and examined by a competent person.

6.8 Log books and voyage records should be required to be kept up to date.

6.9 Crew and passengers lists should be formalised and maintained.

FLAG STATE

6.10 The BMA should ensure that all Bahamas registered vessels are inspected in accordance with section 172 of the Bahamas Merchant Shipping Act.

**
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

Names of Passengers

1. C
2. D
3. E
4. F
5. G
6. H
7. I
8. J
9. K

Crew Names

1. L
2. M
3. N
4. O
5. P
6. Q
7. R
8. S
9. T

10/17/2011 15:49
# APPENDIX II

## THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS

### CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY

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<th>Particulars of Ship</th>
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<td>Official Number: 750393</td>
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<tr>
<td>Port of Registry: Nassau</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year of Registry: 2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name of Ship: LEGACY</td>
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### Building Details

- **Where built:** -town: ALABAMA
- **Country:** USA
- **Year built, remanufactured or rebuilt:** 2002

### Propulsion and Engine Details

- **Propulsion:** Twin or more Propeller
- **Type of engines:** Diesel
- **Total power:** 1440 BHP

### Vessel Type, Dimensions and Hull Materials

- **Ship Type:** General Cargo
- **Hull Material:** Steel
- **Length:** 43.98 metres
- **Breadth:** 16.97 metres
- **Depth:** 7.25 metres

## Particulars of tonnage

- **GROSS TONNAGE:** 485
- **NET TONNAGE:** 145

A detailed summary of the tonnages for this ship is shown on the Tonnage Certificate.

I, the undersigned, Registrar of Bahamian Ships at the port of Nassau, hereby certify that the ship, the description of which is prefixed to this my Certificate, has been duly surveyed, and that the above description is in accordance with the official Register, and that the name, residence and description of the owner(s), and the number of sixty-four shares held are as follows:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name, Residence and Occupation of the Owner</th>
<th>Number of Sixty-Four Shares</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>ERNEST ROSCOE DEAN 38 SHERWOOD DR, SAN SOUCI, P O BOX EE-1318 NASSAU BAHAMAS</td>
<td>64</td>
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**Dated at the 21 March 2003**

Registrar of Bahamian Ships

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**NOTE:** A Certificate of Registry is not a document of Title. It does not necessarily contain all changes of ownership, and in some cases does not contain an official record of any mortgage affecting the ship.

In case of any change of ownership it is important for the protection of the interests of all parties that such change be registered in accordance with the law. Therefore any change should be notified to the Registrar immediately.

Should the Vessel be lost, sold or broken up, notice thereof, together with the Certificate of Registry, if in existence, should immediately be given to Registrar of Bahamian Ships.

*Issued in accordance with the Merchant Shipping (Tonnage) Regulations 1992.*
APPENDIX III

Aft bollards ripped off by towing tug

Rescue/Work boat destroyed by wave action
Port side bulwark deformation caused by seas

Port side bulwark deck bracket
APPENDIX IV

General view stern

General view deck
<table>
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<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>GPS</th>
<th>COMPASS</th>
<th>DISTANCE</th>
<th>RPM</th>
<th>SPEED</th>
<th>SIG</th>
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</thead>
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<td>2.5 kts</td>
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</tbody>
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Log Book entry of 9th November

**APPENDIX V**
APPENDIX VI

**M/V Legacy Schedule**

**INTER-ISLAND FREIGHT BOAT**

**NASSAU**
- **TAKING FREIGHT:** MONDAY & TUESDAY 8AM-4PM
- **SAILING:** TUESDAY @ 7PM

**MARSH HARBOUR, ABACO**
- **ARRIVE:** WEDNESDAY @ 6AM
- **FREIGHT DISCHARGE:** WEDNESDAY @ 10AM

**GUANA CAY**
- **ARRIVE:** THURSDAY @ 6AM

**GREEN TURTLE CAY**
- **ARRIVE:** THURSDAY @ 11AM

**MARSH HARBOUR, ABACO**
- **TAKING FREIGHT:** WEDNESDAY & THURSDAY 8AM-4PM
- **SAILING:** THURSDAY @ 7PM

**NASSAU**
- **ARRIVE:** FRIDAY @ 7AM
- **FREIGHT DISCHARGE:** FRIDAY & SATURDAY 9AM-4PM

**M/V Legend Schedule**

**INTERNATIONAL CARGO SERVICE**

**WEST PALM BEACH, FLORIDA**
- **TAKING FREIGHT MONDAY – FRIDAY 9AM-5PM**
- **SAILING MONDAYS @ 4PM FROM WEST PALM BEACH FLORIDA**

**DISCHARGING CARGO:** TUESDAY @ 9AM IN GREEN TURTLE CAY & 3PM MARSH HARBOUR, ABACO

**DISCHARGING CARGO:** WEDNESDAY @ 9AM IN SPANISH WELLS, N. ELEUTHERA & ROYAL ISLAND

**DISCHARGING CARGO:** THURSDAY @ 9AM IN NASSAU (ARAWAK CAY) FOR NASSAU & LONG ISLAND

**DISCHARGING CARGO:** FRIDAY @ 9AM IN GREAT HARBOUR CAY & SATURDAY @ 9AM IN NASSAU (WESTERN END POTTER’S CAY DOCK)

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**Out Island Contacts**

**MARSH HARBOUR, ABACO**
- 242-367-2653 – TEL
- 242-367-3642 – FAX
- LEGACYOFFICE@HOTMAIL.COM

**GREEN TURTLE CAY, ABACO**
- 242-365-4220 – TEL/FAX
- CONTACT: RACHEL HODGINS

**GUANA CAY, ABACO**
- 242-365-5067 – TEL
- 242-365-5180 – FAX
- CONTACT: ASHLEY BETHEL

**NORTH ABAO**
- 242-367-0369
- CONTACT: BRENDA SMITH

**LONG ISLAND CARGO SERVICES**
- 242-338-0412 – TEL
- 242-338-0410 – FAX
- CONTACT: ANDERSON ADLERLEY
  Longislandcargo@mol.com

**SPANISH WELLS, NORTH ELEUTHERA**
- 242-333-4022
- CONTACT: BILL ALBURY OR STAN HIGGS

**Palm Beach Steamship Agency**
- 138-B EAST PORT ROAD
- RIVIERA BEACH, FLORIDA 33404
- 561-644-5387 – TEL
- 561-844-8646 – FAX
- PBSSM@BELLSOUL.COM
- CONTACT: MARA MORO

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**Trading schedule and contact details**
APPENDIX VII

Safe Manning Document